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01-618 Eldred v. Ashcroft
Ruling Below (Eldred v. Reno, D.C. Cir., 345 U.S. App. D.C. 89, 239 F.3d 372, 2001 U.S.
App. Lexis 2335, 57 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1842, Copy. L. Rep. (CCl) P28,219)
The court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 is neither in violation of the
"limited times" nor the originality requirements of the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, nor in violation of the 1" Amendment. There is no 1" Amendment right to
exploit the copyrighted works of others. The fact that Congress is extending copyright on
existing works does not violate the originality clause. Finally, 70 years does not exceed
"limited times" nor does the preamble of the Copyright Clause serve as a substantive limit
on Congress' power.
Questiond Presented: Whether the 20-year extension of the terms of all copyrights, set
forth in the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 violates the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution or the 1st Amendment?
Eric ELDRED, et al., Appellants
V.
Janet RENO, in her official capacity as Attorney General, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided February 16, 2001
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs in this case, corporations,
associations, and individuals who rely for
their vocations or avocations upon works
in the public domain, challenge the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. This marks
the first occasion for an appellate court to
address whether the First Amendment or
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
of the United States constrains the
Congress from extending for a period of
years the duration of copyrights, both
those already extant and those yet to
come. We hold that neither does.
I. Background
The CTEA amends various provisions of
the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 5
101 et saq. The portions of the CTEA at
issue here extend the terms of all
copyrights for 20 years as follows: (1) For
a work created in 1978 or later, to which
an individual author holds the copyright,
the Act extends the term to the life of the
author plus 70 years. See Pub L. No. 105-
298 5 102(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2827; 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). (2) For a work created in 1978 or
later that is anonymous, or
pseudonymous, or is made for hire, the
term is extended from 75 to 95 years from
the year of publication or from 100 to 120
years from the year of creation, whichever
occurs first. See Pub. L. No. 105-298 5
102(b)(3), 112 Stat. 2827; 17 U.S.C. 
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302(c). (3) For a work created before
1978, for which the initial term of
copyright was 28 years, the renewal term
is extended from 47 to 67 years, thereby
creating a combined term of 95 years. See
Pub. L. No. 105-298 5 102(d), 112 Stat.
2827; 17 U.S.C. § 304. In all three
situations, therefore, the CTEA applies
retrospectively in the sense that it extends
the terms of subsisting copyrights. As a
result, the CTEA better aligns the terms
of United States copyrights with those of
copyrights governed by the European
Union. See S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 7-8
(1996); Council Directive 93/98, art. 7,
1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
[The court reviewed the history of
congressional extensions of the copyright
term. Every extension has been applied
to all existing and new copyrights. The
first term was 14 years with an available
14 year renewal. Those terms lengthened
gradually until 1976 when the term was
increased to life of the author plus 50
years. If there was no known author, the
term was 75 years from publication or 100
years from creation. CETA adds 20 years
to all copyrights.]
The plaintiffs filed this suit against the
Attorney General of the United States to
obtain a declaration that the CTEA is
unconstitutional. Among the plaintiffs are
a non-profit association that distributes
over the internet free electronic versions
of books in the public domain; a company
that reprints rare, out-of-print books that
have entered the public domain; a vendor
of sheet music and a choir director, who
respectively sell and purchase music that is
relatively inexpensive because it is in the
public domain; and a company that
preserves and restores old films and
insofar as such works are not in the public
domain, needs permission from their
copyright holders -- who are often hard to
find -- in order to exploit them.
The district court entered judgment on
the pleadings in favor of the
Government[, concluding that the CTEA
neither violates the First Amendment nor
the Copyright Clause, which authorizes
the Congress: "To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."]
II. Analysis
The plaintiffs claim that the CTEA is
beyond the power of the Congress and
therefore unconstitutional for three
reasons: first, the CTEA, in both its
prospective and retrospective applications,
fails the intermediate scrutiny appropriate
under the First Amendment; second, in its
application to preexisting works, the
CTEA violates the originality requirement
of the Copyright Clause; and third, in
extending the term of subsisting
copyrights, the CTEA violates the
"limited Times" requirement of the
Copyright Clause -- a requirement that
they say is informed by the goal of
"promoting the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." Because each of these
grounds presents a pure question of law,
we consider them de now. Sae, eg, Unitel
State u Popa, 337 U.S. App. D.C. 411, 187
F.3d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
A. First Amendment
The First Amendment aspect of the
plaintiffs' complaint attacks the CTEA not
only in its application to subsisting
copyrights but also insofar as it extends
the terms of copyrights for works yet to
be created. The Government questions
plaintiffs' standing to complain in the
latter regard.
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1. Standing
[The court rejected the government's
challenge to the plaintiffs' standing
because the plaintiffs would benefit from
the works becoming part of the public
domain. The injury is traceable to the
CTEA and could be redressed by voiding
the CTEA. This is true whether applied
to existing or new works].
2. The merits
The decisions of the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588,
105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985), and of this court in
Unital Video Inc v FCC, 281 U.S. App.
D.C 368, 890 F.2d 1173 (1989), stand as
insuperable bars to plaintiffs' first
amendment theory. In Harper & Row the
Court held that a magazine's advance
publication of excerpts from the memois
of former President Gerald Ford infringed
the copyright thereon. 471 U.S. at 569. In
doing so the Court explained how the
regime of copyright itself respects and
adequately safeguards the freedom of
speech protected by the First
Amendment.
[The court explained the principles
pronounced in Harper & Row and Unitld
Video. The First Amendment guarantees
that no one may copyright ideas or facts.
However, forms of expression are
copyrightable, and this is not an
infringement of First Amendment rights,
especially given the "fair use" protections
granted for scholarship and comment.
Copyrights are categorically immune from
First Amendment challenges.
The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the
cases by arguing that the other cases
involved parties attempting to use
legitimately copyrighted material, whereas
this case involved a challenge to the
copyright, itself. The court rejected this
line of reasoning because the works in
question were already under copyright
protection and the cases cited by the
plaintiffs addressed content-based
protections not present in the current
case.]
B. Requirement of Originality
The plaintiffs' second challenge ostensibly
rests upon Feist Publications, Inc v Rural
Telephone Sera*te Ca, in which the Supreme
Court held that telephone listings
compiled in a white pages directory are
uncopyrightable facts: "The sine qua non of
copyright is originality." 499 U.S. 340, 345,
111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991).
"Originality is a constitutional
requirement" for copyright because the
terms "Authors" and "Writings," as they
appear in the Copyright Clause,
"presuppose a degree of originality." Id at
346.
The plaintiffs reason from this that the
CTEA cannot extend an extant copyright
because the copyrighted work already
exists and therefore lacks originality. Not
so. Originality is what made the work
copyrightable in the first place. [...]
The plaintiffs' underlying point seems to
be that there is something special about
extending a copyright beyond the
combined initial and renewal terms for
which it was initially slated. Nothing in
Feist or in the requirement of originality
supports this, however: All they tell us is
that facts, like ideas, are outside the ambit
of copyright. [... ]
[The plaintiffs argued that Congress may
not issue copyrights that would remove
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knowledge from the public domain, and
therefore a work in the public domain
must lack the originality needed to receive
a copyright. While the court agreed this is
one possible interpretation of Feist, it
dismissed the argument as irrelevant to
this case because the works in question
were already copyrighted.]
C. The Limitation of " limited Times"
We come now to the plaintiffs' contention
that the CTEA violates the constitutional
requirement that copyrights endure only
for "limited Times." This claim at last
speaks to the duration rather than to the
subject matter of a copyright: If the
Congress were to make copyright
protection permanent, then it surely
would exceed the power conferred upon it
by the Copyright Clause.
The present plaintiffs want a limit well
short of the rule against perpetuities, of
course. And they claim to have found it --
or at least a bar to extending the life of a
subsisting copyright -- in the preamble of
the Copyright Clause: "The Congress shall
have power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts..." Their idea is
that the phrase "limited Times" should be
interpreted not literally but rather as
reaching only as far as is justified by the
preambular statement of purpose: If 50
years are enough to "promote ...
Progress," then a grant of 70 years is
unconstitutional. Here the plaintiffs run
squarely up against our holding in
Sdnapper u Fdey, 215 U.S. App. D.C. 59,
667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981), in which we
rejected the argument "that the
introductory language of the Copyright
Clause constitutes a limit on congressional
power." The plaintiffs, however, disclaim
any purpose to question the holding of
Sonapper, indeed, they expressly
acknowledge "that the preamble of the
Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit
on Congress' legislative power." Their
argument is simply that "the Supreme
Court has interpreted the terms 'Authors'
and Writings' in light of that preamble,
and that this Court should do the same
with 'limited Times.'"
The problems with this argument are
manifest. First, one cannot concede that
the preamble "is not a substantive limit"
and yet maintain that it limits the
permissible duration of a copyright more
strictly than does the textual requirement
that it be for a "limited Time." Second,
although the plaintiffs claim that Feist
supports using the preamble to interpret
the rest of the Clause, the Court in Feist
never suggests that the preamble informs
its interpretation of the substantive grant
of power to the Congress (which there
turned upon the meaning of "Authors"
and of "Writings," each standing alone).
499 U.S. at 345-47- Similarly, the Trade-
Mark Cases cited in Feist rest upon the
originality implied by "invention [and]
discovery" and by the "writings of
authors," and make no reference at all to
the preamble. 100 U.S. at 93-94.
III. The Dissent
The foregoing suffices to dispose of
plaintiffs' arguments -- as Judge Sentelle,
dissenting, implicitly recognizes -- and
hence to resolve this case.
[The court argued that the dissent adopted
an argument from an amicus. The court
found that it was improper to expand the
scope of the appeal to include the
argument of an amicus, especially as the
parties to the case rejected the argument
and thus it was not a constitutional issue
before the court. Nor did the government
prepare any counter-arguments because
the plaintiffs did not adopt the argument.]
Even were we to proceed as urged by the
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amicus and the dissent, however, we
would only review the CTEA as we would
any other exercise of a power enumerated
in Article I. That is we would ask,
following McCUloob v Mar/and 17 U.S.
316, 421, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), whether the
CTEA is a "necessary and proper"
exercise of the power conferred upon the
Congress by the Copyright Cause;
assuming Judge Sentelle is correct and
Schapper is wrong about the relationship
of the preamble to the rest of that Cause,
this would require that the CTEA be an
"appropriate" means, and "plainly
adapted" to the end prescribed in the
preamble, "promoting Progress of Science
and useful Arts." The Congress found that
extending the duration of copyrights on
existing works would, among other things,
give copyright holders an incentive to
preserve older works, particularly motion
pictures in need of restoration. See S. REP.
NO. 104-315, at 12 (1996). If called upon
to do so, therefore, we might well hold
that the application of the CTEA to
subsisting copyrights is "plainly adapted"
and "appropriate" to "promoting
progress." See Ladd v Law & Tedndqy
PAss, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985)
(upholding the deposit requirement of the
Copyright Act of 1976 as "necessary and
proper" because the purpose was "to
enforce contributions of desirable books
to the Library of Congress").
Judge Sentelle concludes otherwise only
because he sees a categorical distinction
between extending the term of a
subsisting copyright and extending that of
a prospective copyright. This distinction is
not to be found in the Constitution itself,
however. The dissent identifies nothing in
text or in history that suggests that a term
of years for a copyright is not a "limited
Time" if it may later be extended for
another "limited Time." Instead, the
dissent suggests that the Congress -- or
rather, many successive Congresses --
might in effect confer a perpetual
copyright by stringing together an
unlimited number of "limited Times,"
although that clearly is not the situation
before us. The temporal thrust of the
CTEA is a good deal more modest: The
Act matches United States copyrights to
the terms of copyrights granted by the
European Union, sw Council Directive
93/98, art. 7, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; in an
era of multinational publishers and
instantaneous electronic transmission,
harmonization in this regard has obvious
practical benefits for the exploitation of
copyrights. This is a powerful indication
that the CTEA is a "necessary and
proper" measure to meet contemporary
circumstances rather than a step on the
way to making copyrights perpetual; the
force of that evidence is hardly diminished
because, as the dissent correctly points
out, the EU is not bound by the
Copyright Clause of our Constitution. As
for the dissent's objection that extending a
subsisting copyright does nothing to
"promote Progress," we think that implies
a rather crabbed view of progress:
Preserving access to works that would
otherwise disappear -- not enter the public
domain but disappear -- "promotes
Progress" as surely as does stimulating the
creation of new works.
[The court also pointed out that the
Copyright Act of 1790 applied to and
extended the term of existing copyrights
granted by the states. The court rejected
the argument that this was merely the
federal government asserting its new
power to solely regulate copyright under
the Supremacy Clause .]
Such guidance as the Supreme Court has
given further confirms us in this view of
the matter. The Court has made plain that
the same Cause permits the Congress to
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amplify the terms of an existing patent. As
early as 1843 it established that the status
of a particular invention and its
protections must depend on the law as it
stood at the emanation of the patent,
together with such changes as have been
since made; for though they may be
retrospective in their operation, that is not
a sound objection to their validity; the
powers of Congress to legislate upon the
subject of patents is plenary by the terms
of the Constitution[... ]
McClwg v Kigslad, 42 U.S. 202, 206, 11
L. Ed. 102.
Within the realm of copyright, the Court
has to the present era been similarly
deferential to the judgment of the
Congress. "As the text of the Constitution
makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of
the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order
to give the appropriate public access to
their work product;" that "task involves a
difficult balance between [competing
interests]" as reflected in the frequent
modifications of the relevant statutes. Sony
Corp. u Uniwsal City Studia, Ic, 464 U.S.
417, 429, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574, 104 S. Ct. 774
(1984). And still more recently. "The
evolution of the duration of copyright
protection tellingly illustrates the
difficulties Congress faces [in exercising
its copyright power].... It is not our role to
alter the delicate balance Congress has
labored to achieve." Stezurt v A bend, 495
U.S. 207, 230, 109 L. Ed. 2d 184, 110 S.
Ct. 1750 (1990).
IV. Conclusion:
In sum, we hold that the CTEA is a
proper exercise of the Congress's power
under the Copyright Clause. [...]
* * *
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in
part:
While I concur with much of the
majority's opinion, insofar as it holds
constitutional the twenty-year or more
extension of copyright protection for
existing works, I dissent. This issue calls
upon us to consider the scope of one of
the clauses granting enumerated powers to
Congress, specifically, Art. I, 5 8, cl. 8:
Congress shall have power ... to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries....
[The dissent argued that Unite State u
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, showed that
congressional power is restrained by
"outer limits." The Lopez decision applied
to the Commerce Clause, but the dissent
extended it to all enumerated powers,
including Copyright. The dissent argued
that one test under Lopez is to see whether
the rationale supporting the statute has a
stopping point or whether it would lead to
the regulation of all human activity. The
majority's interpretation of the copyright
power created such an unlimited power.]
Citing Giblrs u Qg(en, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 189-190, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824), the Lopez
Court acknowledged "that limitations on
the commerce power are inherent in the
very language of the Commerce Clause."
514 U.S. at 553. Just so with the
Copyright Clause. [... ]
That clause empowers the Congress to do
one thing, and one thing only. That one
thing is "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts." How may
Congress do that? "By securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the
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exclusive right to their respective wrtings
and discoveries." The clause is not an
open grant of power to secure exclusive
rights. It is a grant of a power to promote
progress. [... ] The majority acknowledges
that "if the Congress were to make
copyright protection permanent, then it
surely would exceed the power conferred
upon it by the Copyright Cause." Maj.
Op. at 10. However, there is no apparent
substantive distinction between
permanent protection and permanently
available authority to extend originally
limited protection. The Congress that can
extend the protection of an existing work
from 100 years to 120 years; can extend
that protection from 120 years to 140; and
from 140 to 200; and from 200 to 300;
and in effect can accomplish precisely
what the majority admits it cannot do
directly. This, in my view, exceeds the
proper understanding of enumerated
powers reflected in the Lopez principle of
requiring some definable stopping point.
The government has offered no tenable
theory as to how retrospective extension
can promote the useful arts. As the
Supreme Court noted in Lopez and again
in United States u Morison, that Congress
concluded a given piece of legislation
serves a constitutional purpose "does not
necessarily make it so." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
557 n.2 (internal quotes omitted); Mormison,
120 S. Ct. at 1752. Pressed at oral
argument, counsel for the government
referred to keeping the promise made in
the original grant of exclusivity for a
limited time. The easy answer to this
assertion is that Congress is not
empowered to "make or keep promises"
but only to do those things enumerated in
Article I. The second problem with the
government's assertion is that Congress
made no promise to comimt such an
extension but only to secure the exclusive
rights for the original limited period.
Thirdly, the means employed by Congress
here are not the securing of the exclusive
rights for a limited period, but rather are a
different animal altogether: the extension
of exclusivity previously secured. This is
not within the means authorized by the
Copyright Clause, and it is not
constitutional.
The majority responds to this problem of
the statute's exceeding the constitutional
grant by reliance on Sdmapper u Fdey, 215
U.S. App. D.C. 59, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), "in which we rejected the
argument 'that the introductory language
of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit
on congressional power.' " Maj. Op. at 10
(quoting 667 F.2d at 112).
However, it does not appear to me that
this is the holding of Sdnapper. [... ]
Rather, the Sdmspper analysis again takes
us back to the Lopez approach to judicial
interpretation of the enumerated powers
clauses. In Lopez, one of the means
employed to determine the
constitutionality of extended application
of the Commerce Clause is an elemental
inquiry into whether in each case the
purportedly regulated action "in question
affects interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at
561. However, the jurisdictional element is
not necessary under Lopez analysis of
Commerce Cause regulation where
Congress is directly regulating "the use of
the channels of interstate commerce" or
"persons or things in interstate
commerce." Id at 558. Similarly, I suggest
that in analyzing the extent of
congressional power under the Copyright
Clause, the Sdmpper holding that each
individual application of copyright
protection need not promote the progress
of science and the useful arts does not
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mean that Congress's power is otherwise
unlimited, anymore than the lack of a
necessity for case-by-case analysis of the
effect on interstate commerce validates
anything Congress may wish to do under
the rubric of the Commerce Clause.
Though, under Schapper, we may not
require that each use of a copyright
protection promote science and the arts,
we can require that the exercise of power
under which those applications occur
meet the language of the clause which
grants the Congress the power to enact
the statute in the first place. This the
extension does not do. It is not within the
enumerated power.
The majority suggests that my reading of
Sahmpper is somehow foreclosed by the
fact that it accepts the argument of an
amicus. [...] Neither I nor the amicus
raise any issue not raised by the parties to
the case, nor disposed of by a majority of
the court. [... ] That the amicus argues
more convincingly in appellants' favor on
the issue raised by the appellants than they
do themselves is no reason to reject the
argument of the amicus.
Nor are we constrained by the parties'
apparent agreement as to the state of the
law under Scnapper. The Supreme Court
has made it clear that [... ] 'when an issue
or claim is properly before the court, the
court is not limited to the particular legal
theories advanced by the parties, but
rather retains the independent power to
identify and apply the proper construction
of governing law.' " Id (quoting Kanm u
Kenper Fin Sers., Inc, 500 U.S. 90, 99, 114
L. Ed. 2d 152, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991)).
I find two other arguments the majority
invokes against my dissent unpersuasive.
The enactment by the first Congress in
1790 regularizing the state of copyright
law with respect to works protected by
state acts preexisting the Constitution
appears to me to be sui genes. Necessarily,
something had to be done to begin the
operation of federal law under the new
federal Constitution. The Act of May 31,
1790, 1 Stat. 124, created the first (and for
many decades only) federal copyright
protection; it did not ectend subsisting
feden copyrights enacted pursuant to the
Constitution. Cf Wheaton v Petes, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591, 661, 8 L. Ed. 1055 (1834)
("Congress, then, by this [copyright] act,
instead of sanctioning an existing right, as
contended for, created it."). The fact that
the CTEA "matches United States
copyrights to the terms of copyrights
granted by the European Union," Maj.
Op. at 13 (citing Council Directive 93/98,
art. 7, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9), is immaterial
to the question. Neither the European
Union nor its constituent nation states are
bound by the Constitution of the United
States. That Union may have all sorts of
laws about copyrights or any other subject
which are beyond the power of our
constitutionally defined central
government.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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'Limitless' Copyright Case Faces High Court Review
The Los Angeles Times
February 20, 2002
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court announced Tuesday
that it will hear a major challenge to
Congress' power to extend the copyrights
of films, books and songs that first
appeared in the 1920s and 1930s--a move
that could result in hundreds of thousands
of classic and forgotten works becoming
freely available via the Internet.
Films such as "Gone with the Wind" and
"The Wizard of Oz," the music of the jazz
era and the compositions of George and
Ira Gershwin, novels such as "The Great
Gatsby" and "The Sun Also Rises," even
Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck--all
would have passed into the public domain
had Congress in 1998 not extended their
legal shield by 20 years [correction:
copyrights for many of these works would
not have lapsed until 2003 or later].
But this challenge to the copyright
extension is not just about the classic
books, music and movies that are well-
loved today. Opponents of the extension
say that if all the works published decades
ago--and then forgotten--were in the
public domain, many would have a second
chance at popularity, thanks to Internet
archivists who would make them easily
accessible.
Under pressure from Hollywood studios
and music publishers, Congress has
extended the period of copyright
protection 11 times over the last 40 years.
The result, say scholars
"to transform a limited
virtually limitless one."
and libranans, is
monopoly into a
The copyright laws are intended to
encourage creativity by allowing authors,
composers and filmmakers to profit from
their works. But under the recent
extension, the legal monopoly continues
for 70 years after an individual author's or
composer's death.
"How can you say you are creating
incentives for authors who are long
dead?" asked Jessica Litman, a law
professor at Wayne State University in
Detroit, one of 21 copyright law experts
who urged the Supreme Court to take up
the issue.
"Without some check on congressional
power, it is unlikely that any of the
cultural and historical works of the first
half of the 20th century will ever enter the
public domain," added UC Berkeley law
professor Mark Lemley.
In a statement issued by his office, Jack
Valenti, the president of the Motion
Picture Assn. of America, said he had
"absolute confidence that the Supreme
Court will uphold the decision" of a lower
court and "the wisdom of the Congress . .
. in extending the term of copyright
protection by 20 years to maintain parity
with the European Union and other
nations."
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In their appeals, the scholars and Internet
entrepreneurs said the copyright
extensions have the unfortunate and
unintended effect of burying works that
could be resurrected.
The Gershwin tunes and "The Great
Gatsby" will live on, they noted, and the
copyright laws will determine only who
profits from their existence.
But the same is not true of most original
works. "Millions of copyrighted works are
created every year, yet after 75 years, few
remain in circulation," the copyright
scholars said. In 1930, for example, 10,027
books were published in the United
States. Only 174 remain in print today.
"Thousands of old movies sit in shelves
deteriorating because the companies that
hold the copyright make no efforts to
restore them or make them available,
while their copyright status prevents
others from preserving these works,"
according to a brief filed on behalf of
librarians and archivists.
To illustrate their point, they cited Frank
Capra's 1946 film "It's a Wonderful Life,"
which had a second life when its copyright
was allowed to lapse because of an
oversight. This forgotten movie "lay
gathering dust in a movie studio until the
early 1970s," when its copyright expired.
Once it passed into the public domain,
several public broadcasting stations aired
it during the Christmas season. Within a
few years, the forgotten film became a
classic and a Christmas tradition.
And now, thanks to digital technology and
the Internet, millions of such works can
be restored and made available to the
public, the librarians and archivists told
the court.
The justices considered the appeals for
several weeks before voting to grant the
case, known as Eldred vs. Ashcroft, 01-
618.
Its lead plaintiff, Eric Eldred, runs an
Internet library that posts works in the
public domain. But perhaps more
important, his appeal was filed by
Stanford law professor Lawrence Lessig,
one of the foremost legal experts on the
Internet and the law.
I-is appeal challenges the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,
which added 20 years to most copyrights.
Because of that law, "an extraordinary
range of creative invention will be blocked
from falling into the public domain at
least until 2019--or longer if Congress
extends the copyright term again," Lessig
said.
This, he argues, is unconstitutional.
First, he says, the Constitution gives
Congress a limited power to protect
copyrights. It says Congress can "promote
the Progress of Science" by granting
"exclusive rights" to authors for "limited
times."
Lessig argues that Congress has violated
this clause by "creating in practice an
unlimited term" for copyrights.
The nation's Copyright Act in 1790
protected written works for 14 years, after
which authors could seek a renewal for 14
more years. This 28-year limit continued
until 1909, when Congress doubled the
limit to a possible 56 years.
Since 1962, Congress has repeatedly
extended the maximum term, usually
under pressure from movie producers and
the music industry.
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"The real beneficiaries of this are big
media companies, because they own the
copyrights," said Washington lawyer
Daniel H. Bromberg. "The 1998 bill was
snidely referred to as 'The Mickey Mouse
Extension Act' because it was seen as
protecting Disney's characters."
Before Congress, proponents of the
extension argued that creators of works
that remain valuable deserve to profit
from them.
And Tuesday, underscoring the
importance of traditional characters, Walt
Disney Co. executives trotted out Mickey
Mouse, Peter Pan and "Beauty and the
Beast's" Belle at the company's
shareholder meeting in Hartford, Conn.
These Disney characters are
"extraordinary assets," Disney President
Bob Iger said. "They are among the
reasons the Disney brand is so incredibly
strong by any measure."
Under the law being challenged, works for
hire, including films, are protected for 95
years after their release. Works by
individual authors or composers are
protected for 70 years after their deaths.
In their appeal, Lessig and his colleagues
also say the extended copyright
monopolies violate the 1st Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech. Usually,
the government should not limit free
speech more than necessary, and a 95-year
shield for some works is well more than
necessary, Lessig argues.
Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Washington rejected a challenge to the
copyright extension on a 2-1 vote. Its
judges said only Congress could determine
a reasonable time period for a copyright.
Moreover, the appeals court said old films
and books are more likely to survive if
their copyright value is preserved.
"Extending the duration of copyrights on
existing works would, among other things,
give copyright holders an incentive to
preserve older works, particularly motion
pictures in need of restoration," the judges
wrote.
U.S. Solicitor Gen. Theodore B. Olson
said he agreed and urged the court to
reject the challenges to the law. There is
"no 1st Amendment right to exploit the
work that Congress has purported to
protect," Olson said.
The American Library Assn., the Internet
Archive and dozens of legal experts filed
briefs in recent months urging the high
court to rethink that presumption.
So far, however, the Supreme Court has
heard only from those groups that oppose
the copyright extension. They will file
their legal briefs in several months, and
the case will not be heard before the high
court until the fall.
Copyright © 2002 The Los Angeles Times
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Copyright Crusader
The Boston Globe Magazine
August 29, 1999
Daren Fonda
The day Eric Eldred decided to launch a
Web site, he didn't think many people
would care. He was doing it to inspire his
triplet teenage daughters to read more.
Emma, Anna, and Bonnie had come
home from Pinkerton Academy in Deny,
New Hampshire, complaining about
Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.
The three sophomores, especially Emma,
were put off by the old-style language and
found the book boring.
It was the spring of 1995, and Eldred, a
technical analyst for a computer magazine,
was looking for a hobby. "I thought to
myself: 'This is a great work of literature.
It's the first piece of literature teenagers
are exposed to. Can I do something to get
them more interested in it?"'
Eldred went on the Internet to see if there
were any resources to liven up the book.
Like many classics, it had been put on line
by several nonprofit sites. But Eldred felt
these electronic editions were inferior to
their print versions; they had typos, or
relied on outdated texts, or were difficult
to read since they'd been scanned in
crudely. He decided to create his own on-
line edition, sprucing it up with a glossary,
a time line, illustrations, and a biography
of Hawthorne.
Then he thought, why not put other
books on line, too? He envisioned a global
electronic library that would make unusual
and out-of-print books available for
people who couldn't find them in libraries
or used-book stores. His e-library would
be accessible to the blind through text-to-
speech generators. Getting permission
from publishers wouldn't be a problem,
he thought, since the works he wanted
were all in the public domain, their
copyrights expired.
Eldred filled his digital shelves with books
that suited his tastes. There were texts on
small boats, 19th-century natural histories,
children's stories for parents to read aloud
to kids. He published The Lfe of the
Caterpilar, by amateur entomologist J.
Henri Fabre, to show children that you
don't need a PhD to do good science. He
put up a novel called Woden Cwvses, by
Roland Dorgeles, because he thought it
was a terrific, though forgotten, World
War I story. He even scanned in a book of
poetry by his mother.
At first, not many people noticed the Web
site: eldred.ne. mediaone.net. But as time
went by, a steady flow of visitors streamed
in, and the response was strong. People
around the world e-mailed praise. His
daily hit count grew to 20,000. In 1997,
the National Endowment for the
Humanities recognized his Eldritch Press
as one of the 20 best humanities sites on
the Web. More recognition came when
both the Nathaniel Hawthorne Society
and the William Dean Howells Society
endorsed Internet links to his pages. To
Eldred, the recognition was thrilling, and
he planned an ambitious agenda, hoping
to scan in rare works with copyrights that
were scheduled to expire.
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Then something happened that would
change not only Eldred's homespun Web
site, but his life as well.
October 27, 1998, as the nation was
riveted by the impeachment scandal,
President Clinton quietly signed into law
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act. The lack of ceremony
belied the far-reaching implications of the
law, whose impact would be felt from the
corporate headquarters of Disney to the
back rooms of small New England
publishers. The act, sponsored by the late
singer-songwriter and congressman,
extended protection by 20 years for
cultural works copyrighted after January 1,
1923. Works copyrighted by individuals
since 1978 got "life plus 70" rather than
the existing "life plus 50"; works made by
or for corporations, known as "works
made for hire," got 95 years. Works
copyrighted before 1978 were shielded for
95 years, regardless of how they were
produced.
Pop icons such as Mickey Mouse, books
such as The Great Gatsby, films such as The
Jazz Sie, musicals such as Show Bazt
tens of thousands of works copyrighted
under earlier laws and poised to enter the
public domain were covered until at least
2019.
The law ensured that the estates of writers
and composers would continue to collect
royalties from the artists' works. It was
also crucial for large publishing houses
and movie studios like Disney and Warner
Bros., which rely on revenues from
licensing their old copyrighted products.
(Mickey Mouse, copyrighted in 1928 as
Steamboat Willie, would have entered the
public domain in 2004; Mickey - through
Disney's consumer products division and
theme parks helped bring in $8 billion in
1998, according to the New York
investment bank Salomon Smith Barney.)
The Bono Act, however, also affected
noncommercial interests like Eldred's. He
could still publish The Scader Later, but a
couple of favorites were now off-limits: an
out-of-print collection of stories by
Sherwood Anderson, Hons and Men, and
an edition of Robert Frost's poetry
collection New Hanpshire, , the only one,
Eldred claims, with the correct
punctuation. Both works, published in
1923, were covered under Bono.
Eldred wasn't just angry about the act's
impact. He and other critics didn't like the
way the bill became law. In 1995, it had
been introduced in the House and the
Senate, and both chambers held hearings.
But the bill never made it out of
committee, because restaurant and bar
owners wanted a broader exemption on
paying royalties for music broadcast in
their establishments. It took three years
for the restaurateurs to win their
exemption. The bill cleared the House in
March 1998 but stalled in the Senate.
Finally, in October, just before the end of
the congressional term, a similar version
reached the Senate floor, passed by
unanimous consent, and cleared the
House the same day in a voice vote. No
members of Congress had to go on record
with their votes. It didn't help the bill's
critics that the Starr Report had recently
been delivered and the Washington press
corps was preoccupied with the midterm
elections and Bill Clinton's impeachment
hearings.
Opponents thought the bill had been
slipped through when no one would
notice. "There wasn't any debate," says
Eldred, "no public consideration of the
trade-offs being made. Where were the
people charged with protecting the public
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domain historians, archivists, free speech
advocates? I was writing letters to
newspapers, trying to get attention to the
issue. But the public didn't realize what
was going on; they didn't understand the
consequences.
One person who had come forward was
Arizona State University law professor
Dennis Karjala, a copyright expert [...].
"For the first time in our history, almost
nothing is entering the public domain,"
says Kaijala. "You have some famous
copyrights in danger of expiring. Their
owners didn't relish their money stream
drying up."
Many of these copyright owners had made
it clear to Congress that they wanted an
extension bill passed. According to the
nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics,
in Washington, media companies and
their political action committees
contributed more than $6.5 million to
members of Congress during the 1997-98
election cycle. Representative Howard
Coble, a Republican from North Carolina
and cosponsor of the House bill, got
$63,000 in individual and PAC donations.
A Senate cosponsor, Republican Orrin
Hatch of Utah, received $50,000 from
major donors, including the seven major
movie studios, the Motion Picture
Association of America, and the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers.
Disney was one of the biggest donors.
Eight of the Senate bill's 12 sponsors
received contributions from Disney, as
did 10 of the original House bill's 13
sponsors. Democrat Patrick Leahy of
Vermont, the ranking minority member
on the Senate Judiciary Committee (which
passed the bill) and a man who very
publicly forgoes PAC contributions, got
nearly $20,000 from individual Disney
employees. (Only Time Warner's
employees contributed more. They gave
Leahy $36,000.)
Disney chairman Michael Eisner even
lobbied personally. One week after he
flew to Washington to meet with Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi,
Lott signed on as a cosponsor. That day,
Lott's campaign committee received a
check from Disney for $1,000, and 11
days later, Disney donated $20,000 in
unrestricted "soft money" to the National
Republican Senatorial Committee.
The reason for all this lobbying was clear.
Even bigger money - was at risk As the
Bono bill's advocates pointed out, the
nation's "copyright industnies" -
publishing, film, music contributed $280
billion to the US economy in 1996.
Though most of these revenues come
from recent works, old copyrights are also
highly lucrative. The Rodgers and
Hammerstein Organization, for instance,
earns $10 million annually in royalties and
licensing fees. A nationwide license for a
Gershwin song, worth between $45,000
and $75,000 15 years ago, now earns more
than $250,000. (George Gershwin's
Rhapsody In Blue, copyrighted in 1924 and
scheduled to enter the public domain on
January 1, 2000, under the old law,
became United Airlines's theme song for
an estimated $500,000.)
Perhaps the lobbyists' most effective
argument was that American copyright
law should be made to conform with that
of the European Union, where most
American culture is consumed. The PACs
noted that America's intellectual property
is its most successful export, earning $60
billion annually on foreign shores. If US
law was not harmonized with the
European standard of "life plus 70 years,"
copyrights on US media would expire in
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Europe before they did at home, unfairly
penalizing American corporations and
creators. Rock star Carlos Santana,
speaking for his colleagues, testified, "I
find it unacceptable that I am accorded
inferior copyright protection in the world
marketplace."
Protect American interests abroad who
could argue with that? Senator Edward M.
Kennedy remarked in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report: "Harmonization [with
European law] will yield significant
economic benefits to our Nation generally
and to our creators in particular - benefits
which, in turn, will stimulate future
creativity and eventually lead to a broader
and richer public domain." Republican
Senator Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina later concurred: "This bill will
greatly benefit the American copyright
community."
To professor Karjala, though, Bono was
little more than corporate welfare. "The
media companies gave heavily in return
for extra protection," he says. "It's as
simple as that." He calls the
harmonization argument a smokescreen.
"Our trade surpluses [with Europe] are
dependent on current works like Jurassic
Park, not on the relatively few works from
the 1920s and 1930s whose copyright
owners benefit from term extension. The
biggest market for these older works is
right here at home. So it's mainly
American consumers who wind up paying
more. It's hard to argue that the law would
have much impact on our balance of
trade."
[Daren Fonda is a freelance writer based
in New York City]
Copyright © 1999 Globe Newspaper
Company
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Supreme Court to Review Copyright Term Extensions
E-Business Law Bulletin
March 18, 2002
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether Congress violated the
Constitution when it passed the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998, which
added 20 years to the length of copyrights
for existing works. The Constitution says
copyrights should last for only a limited
time, but Congress' repeated term
extensions, most recently embodied in the
CTEA, amount to a perpetual term of
copyright protection for authors, the
plaintiffs argued. Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft,
No. 01-618, cert. granted (U.S., 19-FEB-
02).
Last February the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
that Congress had the authority to extend
copyright protection terms for existing
works without violating the Constitution's
requirement that a copyright last for only
a limited time.
The court's decision came in the wake of a
challenge by a group of individuals,
corporations and associations which
sought to exploit creative works that
would have entered the public domain but
for passage of the CTEA.
The CTEA amended the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. Section 101 et seq., by
extending the amount of time that certain
types of copyrighted works would be
protected and by applying the extension
to both new works and existing works
that were protected by copyright. It did
not restore copyright protection for works
that were already in the public domain at
the time of enactment. The purpose of the
CTEA was to bring U.S. copyright law in
line with laws of the European Union.
The plaintiffs alleged that the CTEA
violated both their First Amendment
rights to exploit the works that would
have entered the public domain and
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution,
the Patent and Copyright Clause. That
clause states: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."
In its ruling upholding the CTEA, the
D.C. Circuit said the plaintiffs have no
First Amendment interest in copyrighted
works owned by others. The Copyright
Act's fair-use provisions take care of
concerns about copyright law impinging
on free-speech rights, the court said
The panel also rejected the plaintiffs'
novel argument that copyrights in existing
works cannot be extended because at the
time of extension, the works are no longer
original, since they have not changed in
any way since they were created. The
court said nothing in the Constitution
prevents Congress from extending
copyrights for existing works.
The panel rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that it should interpret the phrase "limited
Times" in light of the Copyright Clause's
preamble, which states, "The Congress
shall have power '[tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."' In
other words, the plaintiffs argued that
"limited Times" means only the length of
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time necessary to achieve the purpose of
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."
Judge David B. Sentelle dissented from
the majority opinion, saying the
Constitution requires some "outer limit"
for congressional power.
The 'Installment Plan'
The plaintiffs sought review of the
decision from the Supreme Court, arguing
that the CTEA will keep a wide range of
works under copyright until 2019, or
longer if Congress again extends the term
of protection.
"By abstracting the term 'limited Times'
from the full text of the Copyright Clause,
the circuit court has rendered meaningless
the Framers' plain and express intent to
restrict the duration of monopolies over
speech," the plaintiffs said in their
petition. "Under the authority of this case,
Congress can now continue the practice
of extending the term of subsisting
copyrights without limit. It can thus
achieve a perpetual copyright term 'on the
installment plan."'
The Department of Justice urged denial of
the petition.
"The decision of the court of appeals is
correct and does not conflict with any
decision of this Court or of any other
court of appeals," the DOJ said.
"Petitioners cite no decision of any court
holding that Congress cannot, consistent
with the Copyright Clause, enact
legislation that extends the term of
existing copyrights. They cite no decision
of any court striking down an extension of
copyright terms on First Amendment
grounds. And they cite no decision of any
other court addressing, much less
rejecting, the validity of the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998."
The DOJ is represented by Solicitor
General Theodore B. Olson, Assistant
Attorney General Robert D. McCallum
Jr., and DOJ attorneys William Kanter
and John S. Koppel.
The plaintiffs are represented by Geoffrey
S. Stewart, Daniel H. Bromberg and H.
Brian Holland of Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue in Washington, D.C.; Lawrence
Lessig of the Center for Internet &
Society at Stanford Law School in
Stanford, Calif.; and Charles R. Nesson
and Jonathan L. Zittrain of the Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard
University in Cambridge, Mass.
Copyright a 2002 Andrews Publications
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In Step with the World
The National LawJournal
March 6, 2002
Edward Samuels
The U.S. Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Eldred v Ashcroft, No. 99-
5430, to review the holding by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act is constitutional. Some of
the D.C. Circuit's reasoning may indeed
be questionable. The court concluded that
the preamble to the Constitution's
copyright clause (granting Congress the
power "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing"
exclusive rights "for limited Times") "is
not a substantive limit on Congress'
legislative power." The court goes on to
conclude that "copyrights are categorically
immune from challenges under the First
Amendment" because of the
idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use
doctrine and other limiting principles that
already factor in the constitutional
considerations. These extreme views
oversimplify complicated issues.
But while the restrictive view of the D.C
Circuit may not be ideal, it would be a
major mistake to jump to the other pole
and hold that Congress does not have the
power to grant copyright protection, as it
did in the 1998 act, for the life of the
author plus 70 years (for works created
since 1978), or for a total of 95 years (for
works created before 1978).
A 1978 extension, from a maximum of 56
years after publication, to life of the
author plus 50 years, was simply a
response to what had become the
copyright norm in the rest of the world.
Indeed, such a term was the minimal
requirement without which we would not
have been able to join the Berne
Convention in 1988, almost exactly 100
years after it had been adopted
throughout much of the rest of the world.
The 1998 extension, in turn, was designed
to catch up to the term of copyright
recently adopted throughout the
European Union and by other countnies.
Under Article 7(8) of the Berne
Convention, countnies with a life-plus-70
term do not have to recognize the rights
of foreign authors whose works have
expired in their own countries. In other
words, for American creators of books,
music, movies and computer programs to
take advantage of the additional 20 years
of copyright in other countries, the United
States had to extend its own term to life
plus 70.
Professor Lawrence Lessig has
spearheaded publisher Eric Eldred's case
and argued on his behalf before the D.C.
Circuit. In his recent book "The Future of
Ideas," Lessig purports to explain the
history of copyright term extensions. He
characterizes them as essentially a power
grab by giant American corporations bent
on squeezing every last dollar from their
copyrights. He doesn't even consider the
international context in which Congress
acted. Lessig suggests that the United
States adopt a short copyright term,
subject to renewal every five years. This
proposal, or indeed any proposal for a
term of less than life of the author plus 50
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years, would be in violation of our treaty
obligations under Berne.
WHAT'S NE W?
The argument that the 1998 act might be
unconstitutional is perhaps strongest in its
application to the extension of copyright
terms for existing works. As emphasized
by D.C. Circuit Judge David Sentelle in
his dissent, such works have already been
created. An extension of copyright is
therefore not necessary to encourage their
creation. Yet, it would be a dangerous
analysis to accept Eldred's suggestion that
every single amendment to the copyright
act must be justified by a showing that it
results in the creation of additional works.
After all, the term extension did not take a
single work out of the public domain; the
copyrights in works published before
1923 were not revived.
The only "retroactive" application of the
amendment was to extend the term of
copyright for works that had not yet
expired and fallen into the public domain.
While Eldred may have had an
expectation that certain works would go
into the public domain at some future
date, and that he would be able to publish
them without limit, that expectation was
still subject to the power of Congress to
extend the term of copyright before its
actual expiration. Indeed, the much more
likely candidate for constitutional attack is
17 U.S.C. 104A, the only general
copyright amendment that specifically
restored copyright in works already in the
public domain. That amendment was also
driven by international considerations, in
this case the requirements of the Uruguay
Round Agreement of the World Trade
Organization.
It may be appropriate for the Supreme
Court to reject the D.C. Circuit's
restrictive reading of the constitutional
limits on Congress in passing copyright
laws, but a reversal and remand for
further proceedings would put the whole
of copyright law under an unnecessary
constitutional cloud. The high court
should instead apply its own constitutional
analysis -- a flexible analysis -- to the issue
of congressional power in this area. A
proper constitutional test should not be
simplistic and rigid, but should, as in other
constitutional contexts, reflect a range of
considerations based on some sense of
reasonableness. Was it reasonable for
Congress to pass a term extension act that
brought the United States term into
conformity with that in many other
countries and allowed U.S. copyright
owners to get the benefit of increased
international protection? I believe that, on
reflection, the extension adopted by
Congress will meet any reasonable
standard applied by the Supreme Court.
Copyright D 2002 NLP IP Company
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Breyer Seen as KeyJustice on Copyright Issue
The National La wJournal
February 22, 2002
Victoria Slind-Flor
A key to the U.S. Supreme Court's
handling of a major intellectual property
case may lie in a law review article written
by a young professor in 1970.
That professor, Stephen G. Breyer, is now
a high court justice. But more than three
decades ago, he published an article in the
Harzard Law Reuew saying that courts
should "hesitate to extend or strengthen"
copyright protection. "The Uneasy Case
for Copyright," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281
(1970).
Breyer's piece seems to indicate that he is
an opponent of what is generally called
"copyright creep," by which the term of
copyright protection has been extended
11 times since Congress was empowered
in the Constitution to create copyrights
and patents "for limited times."
On Feb. 18, the high court agreed to hear
a challenge to the most recent term
extension, one signed into law in 1998
granting protection for a work of art for
70 years after the death of its creator or 95
years for the creation of a work done for
hire. Eldmd Ashcnft, No. 01-618.
Several leading IP lawyers surmise that it
may well have been Breyer's interest in
copyright issues that led the Court to
agree to review the act.
Professor Thomas F. Cotter, who teaches
intellectual property law at the University
of Florida, says that Breyer's interest in
the subject is so great that "we might
expect" him to write the Court's opinion.
"The fact that they took the case indicates
that at least some of the justices want to
overturn the D.C. Court's opinion," says
Morgan Chu, a partner at Los Angeles'
Irell & Manella.
At Breyer's 1994 confirmation hearing,
speaking of his law review article, he said,
"I don't know that I have to change that
view.
OTHER PLAYERS
Besides Breyer, well-known figures
connected to the case include a legal
academic of a libertarian bent; a now-dead
member of a 1960s pop singing duo and
his widow the head of an entertainment
trade group; and an animated rodent.
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 was named after its
original proponent, the pop singer turned
congressman who died in 1998 after
hitting his head against a tree in a freak
skiing accident. His widow, Mary Bono,
succeeded to his seat in the House and
continued his copyright campaign.
She told Congress "Sonny wanted the
term of copyright protection to last
forever," but added, "I am informed by
staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution." She proposed the change
from 50 years past the creator's death to
life plus 70 years and noted that Jack
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Valenti, head of the Motion Picture
Association of America, had suggested a
term of "forever less one day."
Stanford University professor Lawrence
Lessig thinks all three ideas stink. Lessig is
the author of "The Future of Ideas," in
which he warns that expansion of IP
rights can stifle creativity and economic
growth.
He is far from alone. Cotter calls the
Bono Act "special-interest legislation that
was crafted to satisfy the interests of
copyright owners who were afraid their
works would fall into the public domain in
the next few years."
Cotter asks a question that other term-
extension opponents often ask. The
framers envisioned copyright as a vehicle
to give authors a monopoly right for a
limited period of time by offering them an
incentive to create works. "But does
continually extending the copyright term
extend the progress of science and the
useful arts? Just how much of an incentive
do we need to give?"
Lessig challenged the new law in a District
of Columbia suit in 1999. His plaintiff is
Eric Eldred, a former government
computer systems analyst who operates
the Internet book publishing company of
Eldrich Press from Derry, N.H The trial
court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit upheld the law.
For his Supreme Court appeal, Lessig has
assembled an impressive array of
supporters, including the American
Association of Law Libraries and most of
the nation's leading legal copyright
academics. Two conservative groups, the
Washington-based Cato Institute and
Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum of Alton,
Ill., have joined to submit an amicus brief
on his side.
Lessig calls the law "the Mickey Mouse
Protection Act." Before the measure
passed, Disney copyrights on some of the
earliest Mickey material were scheduled to
expire in 2003. He says owners "are not
going to give up without a fight over
works they think are still valuable."
Daniel H Bromberg, a Washington
partner for Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
represents sheet music companies and
film restorers that use work that is already
in the public domain. Bromberg says the
Bono bill perverts the framers' intent.
"The purpose of copyright power was not
just to encourage existing authors, but also
to create a public domain that would
provide a source of enjoyment for the
public and a source of inspiration to
future authors and artists," he argues.
The 70-year-plus-life term puts the United
States in conformity with Europe, notes
Christopher Ottenweller, a Silicon Valley
partner for Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.
If it is repealed, "you could have the loss
of rights in one jurisdiction and the
continuation of rights in another," he
notes.
Many opponents to term extension say
that it could limit the availability of
material on the Internet. But Bart A.
Lazar, a partner in Chicago's Seyfarth
Shaw, says that "there is so much content
on the Internet today that to pull 100,000
pieces a year off won't harm the Internet."
Irell & Manella's Chu says, "The Court
will either uphold the statute as the D.C
Circuit did, strike down all or several of
the extensions in the past, or just strike
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Studios May Have the Most to Lose Courts: The Ownership of Early Depictions of
Favorite Characters and Music Could Be at Stake
The Los Angeles Times
February 21, 2002
Henry Weinstein, Ann W. O'Neill, and Meg James
Billions of dollars and the future earning
power of some of the nation's most
cherished cultural icons are at stake as the
U.S. Supreme Court considers a
constitutional challenge to a 1998
copyright extension law, legal experts said
Wednesday.
The experts agreed that the high court's
decision to consider Eldred vs. Ashcroft,
until Tuesday an obscure appeal, could
lead to the most important copyright
decision in more than 100 years.
Movie studios, record companies,
publishers and experts in intellectual
property law were caught by surprise
when the high court announced Tuesday
that it would review a 1st Amendment
challenge mounted by a coalition of
Internet entrepreneurs and legal scholars
to the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act. That act extended
copyrights for an additional 20 years.
"This is a really big deal," said Stephen
Gillers, vice dean of New York University
Law School. "This case is sexy because it's
about money and the arts at the same
time.
"This is it," agreed Dennis S. Karjala, who
teaches copyright and intellectual property
law at Arizona State University Law
School. "It's hard to think of a bigger
copyright case" since the landmark 1879
decision that divided intellectual property
into functional works, which are patented,
and artistic works, which are copyrighted.
Any ruling by the Supreme Court would
affect early depictions of Mickey Mouse,
first copyrighted in 1928, and film classics
such as "Gone With the Wind" and "The
Wizard of Oz," novels such as "The Great
Gatsby" and "The Sun Also Rises," as well
as early jazz music and compositions by
George and Ira Gershwin.
"I think just about everybody in the
[entertainment] business will be impacted.
Somebody's going to get hurt here," said
Gerry Margolis, of Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips.
David Nimmer, a visiting law professor at
UCLA, said that although many of the
recent copyright cases considered by the
Supreme Court have affected just a
narrow portion of copyright holders,
"This case has the potential to affect every
copyright owner."
Ninmer and Gillers predicted that with so
much at stake, the Supreme Court case is
likely to generate millions in new legal
business.
"Probably billions of dollars ride on this
decision, so millions of dollars will be
spent on lawyers and amicus briefs and
research on the history of copyright going
back to King James," Gillers said.
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Walt Disney Co. Chairman Michael Eisner
said it was "too early to comment"
extensively on possible fallout from any
change in the copyright law. He attempted
to minimize the impact.
"All that has happened is that two courts
upheld Congress' extension of the
copyright law, and we don't consider it
unusual that it is going to the last court of
appeal, the Supreme Court," Eisner said.
"If it went bad, and I don't think it will,
we're talking about the very early images
[of Mickey Mouse and others], we're not
talking about our trademarks ... this is not
taking away those values," Eisner said.
But legal and financial analysts anticipate a
huge impact.
"The people who are freaking out are the
studios," said Los Angeles lawyer Neville
Johnson, who has a copyright
infringement case involving a 1920s jazz
song pending in U.S. District Court in Los
Angeles. "It's Mickey Mouse, is why
they're all freaked out."
"In the case of Mickey Mouse, this is a
huge issue," agreed Kevin Lane Keller, a
Dartmouth College marketing professor
and an expert on Disney marketing.
"Mickey has huge symbolic value and he
still has a lot of commercial value.
"These characters and brands have so
much earning potential," Keller said.
"They can be licensed and merchandised
in so many ways. The amounts are
staggering. In a lot of cases, we're talking
about billion-dollar brands."
Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. and Warner
Bros., which have Hollywood's largest
film libraries, also could feel a huge
impact. The studios had no comment.
Wall Street analysts say it's difficult, if not
impossible, to come up with an exact
dollar value for some of the studios' most
popular characters or movies. Companies
are loath to put a value on their
properties, and usually lump revenue from
those characters or properties into
"intangible assets."
But licensing revenue offers a glimpse into
the value of some of these properties. For
example, Disney has said that Winnie the
Pooh and the Hundred Acre Woods
characters generate a third of all of their
licensing revenue.
In the late 1990s, Pooh generated $2
billion a year for Disney and its licensees.
Chris McGurk, chief operating officer at
MGM, said, "Copyright is the only thing
that protects us from people taking our
properties, copying them, exploiting them,
doing whatever they want for free."
MGM's James Bond franchise is said to be
worth more than $1 billion for the Santa
Monica studio. It is about a fourth of the
estimated $5-billion value of MGM's
4,100 film library, analysts have said.
Supporting the appeal, copyright scholars
and Internet entrepreneurs said the
extensions have the unfortunate, and
unintended, effect of burying works that
could be resurrected. The Gershwin tunes
and "The Great Gatsby" will live on, they
said, and the copyright laws will determine
only who profits from their existence.
To illustrate their point, they cited in court
papers an exception to the rule. Frank
Capra's 1946 film "It's a Wonderful Life"
had a second life when its copyright was
allowed to lapse because of an oversight.
This forgotten movie "lay gathering dust
in a movie studio until the early 1970s"
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when its copyright expired, the papers
said.
Once it passed into the public domain,
several public broadcasting stations aired
it during the Christmas season. Within a
few years, the forgotten film became a
classic and a Christmas tradition.
But Margolis, whose firm represents high
profile copyright holders, called such
arguments disingenuous.
"We're not talking about people who want
to make intellectual property available to
the free world, we're talking about people
who want to go into business," he said.
"The opposition is not free-speechers.
They're people who want to go into
business and make a profit on what
yesterday was someone else's property."
Arizona State's Karjala played a key role in
organizing 60 law professors to send a
letter to Congress in 1998 opposing the
Sonny Bono law, contending that it
"would impose substantial costs on the
United States general public without
supplying any public benefit."
He said Wednesday that the case "is an
issue of tremendous importance. It is one
where we simply can never expect
Congress to follow the constitutional
requirements because there is a built-in
bias in the legislative process for
copyright. The beneficiaries are organized
and the general public is not organized.
It's no one's fault. It's structural. It's a
problem of democracy."
Copyright © 2002 The Times Mirror
Company
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The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the Copyright Term Extension
Act, and Elded v. Ashcmit
FindLa w.com
March 5, 2002
Chris Sprigman
Unless you earn your living as an
intellectual property lawyer, you probably
don't know that the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Edred u Ashorf, a
case that will test the limits of Congress's
power to extend the term of copyrights.
But while copyright may not seem
inherently compelling to non-specialists,
the issues at stake in Eldred are vitally
important to anyone who watches movies,
listens to music, or reads books.
If that includes you, read on.
Mickey Mouse Goes to Washington
Back in 1998, representatives of the Walt
Disney Company came to Washington
looking for help. Disney's copyright on
Mickey Mouse, who made his screen
debut in the 1928 cartoon short
"Steamboat Willie," was due to expire in
2003, and Disney's rights to Pluto, Goofy
and Donald Duck were to expire a few
years later.
Rather than allow Mickey and friends to
enter the public domain, Disney and its
friends a group of Hollywood studios,
music labels, and PACs representing
content owners told Congress that they
wanted an extension bill passed.
Prompted perhaps by the Disney group's
lavish donations of campaign cash more
than $6.3 million in 1997-98, according to
the nonprofit Center for Responsive
Politics Congress passed and President
Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act.
The CTEA extended the term of
protection by 20 years for works
copyrighted after January 1, 1923. Works
copyrighted by individuals since 1978 got
"life plus 70" rather than the existing "life
plus 50". Works made by or for
corporations (referred to as "works made
for hire") got 95 years. Works copyrighted
before 1978 were shielded for 95 years,
regardless of how they were produced.
In all, tens of thousands of works that had
been poised to enter the public domain
were maintained under private ownership
until at least 2019.
So far so good as far as Disney and its
friends were concerned, at least. In 1999, a
group of plaintiffs led by Eric Eldred,
whose Eldritch Press offers free on-line
access to public domain works, filed a
challenge to the statute. Eldred argues that
the CTEA is unconstitutional on two
grounds: first, because the statute exceeds
Congress's power under the Copyright
Clause; and, second, because the statute
runs afoul of the First Amendment by
substantially burdening speech without
advancing any important governmental
interest.
Eldred lost before the district court and
the D.C. Circuit. However, there is good
reason to believe that he may yet prevail
in the Supreme Court.
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The CTEA Exceeds Congress's
Copyright Clause Power
Most likely to succeed is Eldred's
argument that the CTEA exceeds
Congress's power under the Constitution's
Copyright Clause (Article I, Section 8),
which provides that
The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and
Discovenes.
The Copyright Clause does two things.
First, it empowers Congress to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Second, the text of the Copyright Clause
limits the means that Congress may adopt
in exercising the enumerated power.
Congress is limited to granting rights to
authors for "limited Times" there can be
no perpetual ownership of intellectual
property.
Clear thinking about the scope of
Congress' Copyright Clause power
requires careful separation of ends from
means. The end the enumerated power
itself is the promotion of progress, a fact
the Supreme Court recognized in Graham
v John Dere Co, where it held that the
"qualified authority" that the Copyright
Clause grants "is limrtad to the pnrmtion of
achnad s in [science and the 'ufd arts' " In
contrast, the copyright grant is not itself
the enumerated power, it is merely the
instrument through which progress may
be realized.
Seen in this light, the CTEA cannot
survive. Because already existing works
cannot be created anew, extension of
subsisting copyrights does not "promote
progress." Congress is not empowered
merely to provide copyright holders with
an additional boon that is not
"progress", but corporate welfare.
This is the point on which the D.C.
Circuit's opinion in Elded should collapse.
The lower court relied on prior circuit
authority holding that the "promote . . .
Progress" language does not restrict
Congress's power. But that authority is
palpably at odds with the Supreme Court's
statement in Graham that the promotion
of progress is the Copyright Clause power.
The D.C. Circuit leaned also on a snippet
in the CTEA's legislative history asserting
that extending subsisting copyrights
would encourage preservation of older
works. But if Congress really wanted to
encourage preservation, it could simply
have offered the quid of an extended
copyright in exchange for the quo of the
copyright holder taking steps to preserve
the copyrighted work for example, by
digitizing it and depositing it in an
electronic archive (such as the non-profit
Internet Archive. There is no such quid pro
quo in the CTEA; rather, the statute is a
giveaway to content owners, a quid pro
nihila
What About Future Copyrights?
The argument set forth above deals only
with the CTEA's grant of retroactive
extensions. Eldred advances another,
somewhat more doubtful, Copyright
Clause argument that applies to future
extensions. The argument is that
Congress's repeated extensions (the
CTEA is but the latest of 11 acts that have
stretched the copyright term from 14
years to beyond 100 years) have rendered
meaningless the stricture that exclusive
rights may be granted only for "limited
times."
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Eldred also advances a First Amendment
challenge: both subsisting and future
copyright extension, Eldred argues,
substantially burden speech by foreclosing
use of expression that would otherwise be
available in the public domain, while
advancing no important government
interest. Lining the pockets of generous
campaign contributors is not, Eldred
maintains, a legiti-iate let alone
important - government interest.
But although the CI'A may be struck
down, Disney and its fellow media giants
will inevitably be back in Congress
pushing a substitute bill. Accordingly, it is
worthwhile to consider briefly why
copyright extension is bad policy, as well
as bad law.
The CTEA vs. The Public Domain
When copyright expires, works are said to
"fall into" the public domain, where they
are usable without charge or need of
authorization.
The linguistic convention by which works
"fall" when they enter the public domain
is revealing: immanent in the phrase is the
notion that a work is debased when no
longer copyrighted. Perhaps it is this view
that allows statutes that shrink the public
domain to gain widespread support.
But disparagement of the public domain is
out of step with our constitutional history,
with the economics of information
markets, and with the real way in which
art, literature, and music are produced in
our culture.
The Framers, Viewing Intellectual
Property As Monopoly, Sought To
Constrain It
The Framers of our Constitution viewed
inventions and expression not as
"property", but as public goods to which
exclusive rights may be granted purely as a
means of incenting production. Thomas
Jefferson expressed the then-dominant
view with characteristic felicity in an 1813
letter:
If nature has made any one thing less
susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea, which an individual
may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is
divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of every one, and the receiver
cannot dispossess himself of it. Its
peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives
an idea from me, receives instruction
himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me .
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a
subject of property. Society may give an
exclusive right to the profits arising from
them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility,
but this may or may not be done,
according to the will and convenience of
the society, without claim or complaint
from anybody.
Correspondence between Jefferson and
Madison regarding the drafting of the
Copyright Clause evidences the same
concern: both men classify copyrights and
patents as "monopolies" sufferable only
for limited periods, and only for the
purpose of incenting invention.
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We Don't Know How Much Incentive
Is Enough, And How Much Is Too
Much
Many policymakers (and even some
intellectual policy mavens) view IP rights
as a one-way street - they assume that the
more IP rights we grant, and the broader
and more durable we make those rights,
the more society will benefit through
increased production of books, music,
movies, etc. The matter isn't even
remotely that simple.
First, the creation of exclusive rights
involves a difficult trade-off between
cration and dissemination. To the extent that
a piece of expression enjoys a market
value, its price is likely to be higher if it is
subject to copyright, as the copyright
owner will be entitled to limit or eliminate
competition in the provision of that
expression to others. At the margin
between life plus 50 and life plus 70
which is the margin in which the CTEA
operates the proponent of a longer term
should be prepared to show that the social
value of the additional incentive
outweighs the harm caused by another
two decades of supra-competitive pricing
and consequent reduced dissemination of
valuable copyrighted work.
That is no mean task, not least because, as
Professor (now Justice) Breyer observed
in The Urway Case for Cyight- A Study of
opyright in Bodes, Phacopia, and Conputer
Prograns, it is not clear that the promise of
exclusive rights is a necessary prod to
artistic creation:
Authors in ancient times, as well as monks
and scholars in the middle ages, wrote and
were paid for their writings without
copyright protection. Taken as a whole ...
the evidence now available suggests that,
although we should hesitate to abolish
copyright protection, we should equally
hesitate to extend or strengthen it.
What was true in ancient Greece and
Rome and in medieval Florence is equally
true today in Brooklyn's DUMBO
painters paint, and writers write, for
reasons other than the size of the royalty
check. But even if you assume that
exclusive rights do make some difference,
there was no attempt back in 1998 (nor
has there been since) to justify the
CTEA's 20-year extension. Of course,
$6.3 million in campaign contributions
can make up for quite severe deficiencies
in the data.
Artists Depend On A Rich Public
Domain
If we know little about the utility of longer
copyright terms, there is abundant
evidence regarding the vital importance to
the progress of our culture of a robust
stock of public domain works.
Most artists, if pressed, will admit that the
true mother of invention in the arts is not
necessity, but theft. And this is true even
for our greatest artists. Shakespeare's
Rono and Juliet (1591) was taken from
Arthur Brooke's poem Ronrus and Juliet
(1562), and most of Shakespeare's
historical plays would have infringed
Holingshead's Ondida oEngland (1573).
For the third movement of the overture
to Thedora, Handel drew on a harpsichord
piece by Gottlieb Muffat (1690-1770).
Passages of both works are compared at
this very interesting web site.
Cultural giants borrow, and so do
corporate giants. Ironically, many of
Disney's animated films are based on
Nineteenth Century public domain works,
including Snow White and the Sewn Darf,
Cindendla, Pinoahio, The Hunchde of Notte
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Danr, Aime in Wond&n -and The Junge
Bck (released exactly one year after
Kipling's copyrights expired).
Borrowing is ubiquitous, inevitable, and,
most importantly, good. Contrary to the
romantic notion that true genius inheres
in creating something completely new,
genius is often better described as opening
up new meanings on well-trodden themes.
Leonard Bernstein's reworking in West
Side Story of Rormo and Juiet is a good
example.
None of this is intended as an argument
that art should be "freed" from copyright.
Our copyright regime is almost as old as
our Constitution, and the creation of
exclusive rights for limited periods is as
sensible an approach now as it was at the
Founding. What is needed is a more
balanced approach to assessing the costs
and benefits of the expanding scope and
duration of IP rights, including copyright
terms. Perhaps if campaign finance reform
succeeds in helping good arguments
compete against ready cash, copyright will
right itself.
Chris Sprigman is Counsel to the
Antitrust Group in the Washington, D.C.
office of King & Spalding. Mr. Sprigman
previously served as appellate counsel to
the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice
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01-653 Federal Communications Commission v. NextWave Personal
Communications
01-657 Arctic Slope Regional Corp. v. NextWave Personal Communications
Ruling Below: (NextWave v. FCC, D.C. Cir., 254 F.3d 130, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
13923)
The court held the FCC violated federal bankruptcy law by revoking the broadband PCS
license of the owner of the license for failure to pay under commission regulations.
Question Presented: Whether Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 525, which
prevents government entities from revoking debtors' licenses solely for failure to pay debts
dischargeable in bankruptcy, conflicts with and displaces the Federal Communications
Commission's rules for congressionally authorized spectrum auctions, which provide that
wireless telecommunications licenses obtained at auction automatically cancel upon the
winning bidder's failure to make timely payments to fulfill its winning bid?
NEXTWAVE Personal Communications Inc. and NextWave Power Partners Inc.,
Petitioners
V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and United States of America,
Respondents;
BELLSOUTH Corportaion, et al., Intervenors
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided June 22, 2001.
TATEL, Circuit Judge:
This case concerns the extent to which
the Bankruptcy Code limits a federal
agency--here, the Federal
Communications Commission--acting to
implement the provisions of its own
statute. Seeking to comply with its
statutory duty to ensure small business
participation in auctions of broadband
PCS licenses, the Commission allowed
winning bidders to pay for their licenses in
installments. As part of this scheme, the
Commission took and perfected security
interests in the licenses, and provided for
license cancellation should a bidder fail to
make timely payments. When appellants,
winning bidders on several licenses,
declared bankruptcy and ceased making
payments, the Commission canceled their
licenses. Applying the fundamental
principle that federal agencies must obey
all federal laws, not just those they
administer, we conclude that the
Commission violated the provision of the
Bankruptcy Code that prohibits
governmental entities from revoking
debtors' licenses solely for failure to pay
debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. The
Commission, having chosen to create
standard debt obligations as part of its
licensing scheme, is bound by the usual
rules governing the treatment of such
obligations in bankruptcy.
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I[Congress gave the Federal
Communications Commission the
authorization to award spectrum licenses
via competitive bidding in 1993. Congress
directed the FCC to (1) encourage
development and rapid deployment of
technologies, (2) make money off the
licenses, (3) encourage the efficient and
widespread use of the spectrums, and (4)
promote competition by disseminating
licenses to a wide variety of applicants.
The FCC auctioned licenses for
broadband personal communication
services (PCS). To promote diversity
among the successful bidders, it set aside
two blocks of licenses for small businesses
and allowed them to pay in installments.
The FCC believed this would remove
financing obstacles for such businesses,
but announced that failure to pay on time
would be grounds for revocation of the
license.
NextWave Personal Communications,
Inc. was awarded a number of licenses,
upon which it made a down payment and
filed agreements which gave the FCC first
claim to the licenses should the company
default on its payments. Subsequently,
Nextwave had difficulty obtaining further
financing, so the FCC suspended the
company's payment obligations and
offered it several ways to surrender some
or all of the company's licenses for
forgiveness of its debt. None of the
restructuring options were appealing to
Nextwave, and unable to work anything
else out, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in New York
The Bankruptcy Code provides for (1) an
automatic stay on all attempts to collect or
enforce debts, (2) an automatic stay on
any attempt to obtain possession or
control over property, with an exception
for governmental units acting within their
regulatory power, and (3) an automatic
stay on any attempt to enforce any lien
against property.
The bankruptcy court asserted jurisdiction
on the basis that NextWave's claim did
not involve regulatory conduct on the part
of the FCC, but the debtor-creditor
relationship between the FCC and
NextWave. It agreed with NextWave that
its bid far exceeded fair market value and
voided the excess portion of the fee.
The Second Circuit reversed, and
NextWave prepared a new plan to pay its
entire debt, including interest and late
fees. The FCC objected, arguing that the
licenses had automatically cancelled when
it missed its first payment deadline. The
FCC then announced a public auction of
NextWave's licenses. The parties returned
to court.
The bankruptcy court declared the FCC
cancellation null and void, being in
violation of automatic stay provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. The court held that
the timely payment requirement lacked a
regulatory purpose.
The Second Circuit again reversed. It
elaborated on its previous holding,
emphasizing that the bankruptcy court
may not interfere with the licensing
decisions of the FCC
NextWave filed a petition with the FCC,
requesting reconsideration of the
cancellation in light of the new plan. The
FCC denied the petition on procedural
grounds, but went on to discuss and reject
the petition on the merits.]
* **
NextWave now challenges the
Commission's decision on two basic
grounds. First, it claims that the license
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cancellation is "patently unlawful,"
Appellants' Opening Br. at 16, under the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
described earlier: the anti-discrimination
provision (section 525), the automatic stay
provision (section 362), and the provision
of the Code allowing debtors to "cure"
their defaults (section 1123). Second,
citing our decision in Trinity Bmdcasting <{
Florida, Inc u FCC, 341 U.S. App. D.C.
191, 211 F.3d 618, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
where we held that an agency may not
"sanction a company for its failure to
comply with regulatory requirements"
without first providing "fair notice" of
those requirements, NextWave argues that
even if the license cancellation is not
barred by the Bankruptcy Code, it is
invalid because the Commission failed to
provide adequate notice that the timely
payment regulations apply to Chapter 11
debtors. The Commission, supported by
Intervenors (the Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association
and several telecommunications
companies) defends its decision.
II
[The court held it had jurisdiction under
47 U.S.C. 5 402(b), which allows appeals
from FCC decisions by holder of any
station license, that NextWave filed a
timely appeal, and that Nextwave's
Bankruptcy Code arguments were not
barred by res judicata.]
III
NextWave argues that the Commission's
cancellation of its licenses violated
sections 525, 1123, and 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, we must
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action
... found to be ... not in accordance with
law [or] ... in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2). This provision requires us
to invalidate agency action not only if it
conflicts with an agencys own statute, but
also if it conflicts with another federal law.
[citations omitted].
We begin with section 525:
[A] governmental unit may not deny,
revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a
license ... or other similar grant to, ...
discriminate with respect to such a grant
against, deny employment to, terminate
the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, a person
that is ... a bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act ... solely because such
bankrupt or debtor ... has not paid a debt
that is dischargeable in the case under this
title or that was discharged under the
Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a). No one disputes that
the Commission is a "governmental unit"
that has "revoked" a license for purposes
of section 525, nor that NextWave is a
"bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act." Pointing to the fact that
the Commission has filed proofs of claim
in bankruptcy court based on its security
interests in PCS licenses, see, eg, Proof of
Clain, In ?v NectWaw Pen. CorrmozicatiorNs,
Inc., No. 98 B 21529 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 16, 1998) (filed on behalf of creditor
The United States of America), NextWave
argues that the installment payment
obligations were dischargeable debts
under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
5 1141(d) (stating that dischargeable debts
under Chapter 11 generally include "any
debts that arose before the date of ...
confirmation" of the debtor's
reorganization plan). And because failure
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to make installment payments was the
"sole triggering mechanism" for automatic
cancellation, NextWave continues, its
licenses canceled "solely because" it failed
to pay dischargeable debts. Appellants'
Reply Br. at 8.
The Commission never denies that if
NextWave had made its payments, the
company could have retained its licenses.
Nor does the Commission dispute that
NextWave's license fee obligations were at
least in part genuine, enforceable debts-
indeed, the Commission's own regulations
provide for their collection if left unpaid.
* * * Instead, the Commission offers a
series of unpersuasive arguments intended
to demonstrate why, notwithstanding
section 525's apparent applicability, the
provision does not bar cancellation of
NextWave's licenses.
First, the Commission [...] [and]
Intervenors suggest that "it would make
little sense for Congress to exempt
governmental 'regulatory' actions from the
stay [under subsection 362(b)(4)] but then
flatly forbid them in [section] 525. Basic
structural coherence requires the
conclusion that [section] 525 does not
prevent a license cancellation already
correctly found exempt from the stay as
regulatory." Intervenors' Br. at 18.
This is an interesting argument, but it fails
for several reasons. To begin with, it is
inconsistent with section 525's plain
language. Section 525 clearly and explicitly
prohibits governmental units, for whateur
reason, from canceling licenses for failure
to pay a dischargeable debt * * Various
bankruptcy and district courts,
accordingly, have held that section 525
can apply even if the automatic stay does
not. [citations omitted.]
Moreover, contrary to Intervenors'
argument, this interpretation of section
525 does not render the Code "structurally
incoherent." Though this reading does
mean that an action exempted under
subsection 362(b)(4) might nonetheless be
barred by section 525, it does not render
subsection 362(b)(4) meaningless, because
that subsection covers a different and
wider variety of actions than section 525.
Even if the Commission were correct that
section 525 should be read to permit all
actions exempted from the automatic stay
by subsection 362(b)(4), that argument
would be inapplicable to this case because
subsection 362(b)(4) does not apply to the
stay of acts to "create, perfect, or enforce"
liens against property of the estate or of
the debtor imposed by subsections
362(a)(4) and (5). Here, NextWave
executed security agreements giving the
Commission a "first lien" on the
company's interest in the licenses, and
under subsections 362(a)(4) and (5), "a
creditor holding a lien on property of the
estate may not enforce the lien by seizure,
foreclosure, or otherwise." 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY P 362.03[6] (15th
ed. rev. 2000). Stayed actions include
"self-help remedies against collateral" such
as "repossession." Id P 362.03[6][b].
Before the bankruptcy court, Commission
counsel acknowledged that canceling the
licenses and seeking to collect on the debt
was "tantamount ... to foreclosing on
collateral." Hearing Tr. at 14, In re
NextWaw Pes. CoraicatiorNs, Inc, No. 98
B 21529 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999).
Thus, contrary to the Commission's
argument, and notwithstanding the
applicability of the regulatory power
exception, section 362's automatic stay
das apply here. This is thus not a case in
which section 525, if applicable, would bar
an action exempt from the automatic stay.
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The Commission next argues that section
525 is inapplicable because NextWave's
license fee obligation was not a
"dischargeable" debt. In support of this
proposition, the Commission offers two
arguments. First, it claims that the New
York bankruptcy court could not have
discharged NextWave's debt because the
Second Circuit, whose decisions are
binding on that court, held in its initial
opinion that so long as NextWave
retained its licenses, its payment obligation
was subject to neither modification nor
discharge in bankruptcy. As a result, the
Commission concludes, the payment
obligation was not a debt "dischargeable"
in bankruptcy while the license was held.
We disagree. To begin with, it is unclear
that the Second Circuit in fact thought the
bankruptcy court lacked power to alter or
discharge the payment obligation while
NextWave held the licenses. [... ] Even if
the Commission's reading of the Second
Circuit's opinion is correct, the
Commission's argument assumes that the
phrase "debt that is dischargeable ... under
this title" in section 525(a) refers to the
bankruptcy awrt's power to modify or
discharge a payment obligation. The
provision's plain language, however, refers
to a payment obligation that can be
modified or discharged under the
Bankruptcy Code, and as we read the
Second Circuit's opinion, the court merely
decided that insofar as timely payment
was a condition for license retention, the
bankruptcy court had no authority to
modify it. It never decided that a court of
competent jurisdiction (such as this one)
could not modify or discharge it under
section 525.
The Commission also argues [...] that
because (for legitimate regulatory motives)
it made timely payment a regulatory
requirement, it should be permitted to
cancel licenses for failure to meet that
requirement despite section 525's plain
language ("a governmental unit may not ...
revoke ... a license ... to ... a bankrupt ...
solely because such bankrupt ... has not
paid a debt that is dischargeable ... under
this title"). But basic principles of
statutory interpretation preclude such a
result. To begin with, section 525 contains
several exceptions, but none for agencies
fulfilling regulatory purposes. * This in
itself suggests that Congress did not
intend to provide a regulatory purpose
exception to section 525. * * Moreover,
other parts of the Bankruptcy Code
contain explicit regulatory purpose
exceptions. Section 362, as we have seen,
exempts from certain provisions of the
automatic stay any "governmental unit"
exercising its "police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(4). Section 362 also
contains a series of narrower exceptions
for certain named agencies that have
entered lending relationships, allowing
them to engage in particular acts of
foreclosure and other actions. Se, eg, 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(8) (exception permitting
HUD Secretary to foreclose on certain
mortgages insured under the National
Housing Act). To us, these express
exceptions demonstrate that section 525
contains neither an implied regulatory
power exception for governmental units
in general nor an implied agency-specific
exception allowing the Commission to
enforce an automatic cancellation policy
pursuant to an installment payment
scheme under section 309() of the
Communications Act.
* * *
Next, Intervenors argue that even if the
license fee obligation itself is a
dischargeable debt, the Commission did
not cancel NextWave's licenses "solely
because" of failure to pay that debt. * *
[The] license cancellation was intended
231
not to induce payment but instead to
protect the integrity of [the] auction.
We are unconvinced. Intervenors argue
that "solely because" should be read to
mean "solely because of creditor interests
in receiving the money due." But the
statute says nothing about an agency's
motives in canceling a license for failure
to pay a dischargeable debt--it simply says
governmental units may not cancel
licenses "solely because" a debtor "has not
paid' such a debt. S&- 11 U.S.C. 525(a)
(emphasis added). [... ] Adopting
Intervenors' intent-based reading of
section 525 would allow governmental
units to escape section 525's limitations
simply by invoking a regulatory motive for
their concern with timely payment, and as
we have already explained, section 525
contains no implicit regulatory purpose
exception.
... Intervenors point to legislative history
stating that section 525 "does not prohibit
consideration of ... factors such as future
financial responsibility or ability ... if
applied nondiscrniinatorily," H.R REP.
NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), and that "in
those cases where the causes of the
bankruptcy are intimately connected with
the license grant ... an examination into
the circumstances surrounding the
bankruptcy will permit governmental units
to pursue appropriate regulatory policies
and take appropriate action without
running afoul of bankruptcy policy."
Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.3d 265, 271.
But these passages do not lead us to
conclude that section 525 is inapplicable
here. To begin with, we may not "resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text
that is clear." Ratzaf v Unital States, 510
U.S. 135, 147-48, 126 L. Ed. 2d 615, 114
S. Ct. 655 (1994). Moreover, while the
quoted passages do suggest that agencies
may make regulatory decisions (including
perhaps canceling the licenses of bankrupt
debtors) based on factors such as future
financial responsibility or ability, they do
not state that an agency may use timely
payment of a dischargeable debt as the
sole indicator of such responsibility, as the
Commission has done here. Cf H.R REP.
NO. 95-595, at 165 ("The purpose of
[section 525] is to prevent an automatic
reaction against an individual for availing
himself of the protection of the
bankruptcy laws.").
* * *
Finally, noting that section 525 is entitled
"Protection against discriminatory
treatment," and that the House Report on
the bankruptcy bill provides that section
525 "extends only to discrimination or
other action based solely ... on the basis of
nonpayment of a debt discharged in the
bankruptcy case," HR. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 366-67, the Commission suggests that
the provision is inapplicable here because
"all licensees lost their licenses if they
failed to meet the payment deadline."
Appellee's Br. at 23.
The text of section 525, however, includes
"discrimination" only as an item in a series
of prohibited actions: "a governmental
unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a license ... to, [or]
condition such a grant to, [or] discriminate
with respect to such a grant against, [or]
deny employment to, [or] terminate the
employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against a person
that is ... a debtor under this title...." 11
U.S.C. § 525(a) (emphasis added). Another
prohibited action in the series is (as we
have just seen) to "revoke" the license of a
bankrupt "solely because such bankrupt"
has "not paid a debt dischargeable" under
the Bankruptcy Code--precisely what
happened in this case. And the House
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Report itself explicitly states that section
525 "extends only to discrimination or
oher action based solely ... on the basis of
nonpayment of a debt discharged in the
bankruptcy case...." HR. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 366-67 (emphasis added); s also
Walker u Wdde (In re Walker), 927 F.2d
1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1991)
(invalidating under section 525 a license
cancellation policy that applied to
bankrupts and non-bankrupts alike).
We have no doubt that in developing its
installment payment plan, the
Commission made a good faith effort to
implement Congress's command to
encourage small businesses with limited
access to capital to participate in PCS
auctions. We are also mindful that, as the
Commission suggests, allowing NextWave
to retain its licenses may be "grossly
unfair" to losing bidders and licensees
who "complied with the administrative
process and forfeited licenses or made
timely payments despite their financial
difficulties." Appellee's Br. at 9. Any
unfairness, however, was inherent in the
Commission's decision to employ a
licensing scheme that left its regulatory
actions open to attack under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, the very purpose
of which is "to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors." NLRB v Bilisw
& Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527, 79 L. Ed. 2d
482, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). * * The
Code expressly contemplates that
bankrupts will sometimes avoid the
consequences of late or non-payment they
might have faced had they not filed for
bankruptcy. * * And the Code's
restrictions have been applied even to the
official actions of Government agencies.
Se, eg., Witing Pods, 462 U.S. at 209
(enforcing the Bankruptcy Code against
the IRS to prevent seizure of property
under a tax lien and concluding that
"nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its
legislative history indicates that Congress
intended a special exception for the tax
collector"). Here, as we have explained,
we think section 525 prevents the
Commission, whatever its motive, from
canceling the licenses of winning bidders
who fail to make timely installment
payments while in Chapter 11.
We do not think this conclusion frustrates
the purposes of the Communications Act,
because nothing in the Act required the
Commission to choose the licensing
scheme at issue here. Although section
309() suggests the possibility of using
guaranteed installment payments of some
kind, the statute also suggests alternative
methods of facilitating small business
participation. See 47 U.S.C. 5 309()(4)(A).
Indeed, in 1998, the Commission decided
that "until further notice, installment
payments should not be offered in
auctions as a means of financing small
businesses and other designated entities
seeking to secure spectrum licenses." See
Coopxetitie Bidding Paxeing, 63 Fed. Reg.
2315, 2318-19 (Jan. 15, 1998). Moreover,
irrespective of the Commission's decision
to use installment payments as part of its
licensing scheme, nothing in the Act
required it to enter a creditor relationship
with winning bidders, take liens on
licenses, or--most important for our
decision here--make timely payment a
license condition. For example, the
Commission could have required winning
bidders to obtain third party guarantees
for their license fee obligations, or
required full upfront payment from C
Block licensees and helped them obtain
loans from third parties. The Commission
could also have made license grants
conditional on periodic checks of financial
health, a more extensive credit check, or
some other evidence that winning bidders
were capable of using their licenses in the
public interest. Having chosen instead a
scheme that put it in a creditor-debtor
(and lienholder) relationship with its
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Justices Agree to Resolve Wireless Dispute
The Legal Intelligencer
March 5, 2002
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
step into the multibillion-dollar battle over
NextWave's effort to reclaim its prized
wireless phone spectrum licenses.
With virtually every major
telecommunications practice taking part in
some aspect of the dispute, Faderal
Corrwncatiors COnrnsion u NectWaw
Pesonal Corrrwcatioir, No. 01-653, which
will be argued in the fall, promises to be
one of the next term's major business
cases.
"There is so much money at stake, the
court probably felt it had to settle it," said
Donald Verrilli Jr. of Jenner & Block, who
had opposed high court review on behalf
of NextWave. NextWave stock fell in
price in the hours after the court action
was announced. NextWave is also
represented by Gibson Dunn & Crutcher,
whose former partner Theodore Olson
argued for the company in the courts
below. Olson, now solicitor general, has
already recused himself in the case, leaving
his deputy Paul Clement to sign the
government briefs filed on behalf of the
FCC Olson's late wife, Barbara, also was
a lawyer and lobbyist on behalf of
NextWave and some of its investors.
NextWave had won a 1996 auction for the
spectrum licenses with a $5 billion bid,
but filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
soon after, swept up in the crash of the
wireless industry. It had paid a $500
million installment, but the FCC
repossessed the licenses, prompting
litigation by NextWave. A second FCC
auction that ended in January 2001
produced bids of more than $15 billion
for the same spectrum, and already more
than $3 billion in deposits have gone into
government coffers.
But last June, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's
actions, producing what one lawyer
described as a "train wreck" among
bidders for the spectrum licenses. The
appeals panel said the Bankruptcy Code
precluded the FCC from canceling
NextWave's licenses while the company
was in Chapter 11.
In its petition to the high court, the FCC
says the appeals court "effectively
confiscated" the licenses from bidders
who valued the spectrum more highly
than NextWave, and that the decision
"dramatically expands" the reach of
bankruptcy law into regulatory decision-
making.
Yesterday, FCC chairman Michael Powell
welcomed the court's action to "clarify the
relationship between public spectrum
auctions and the U.S. bankruptcy laws."
The high court's action, which means that
the dispute could go unresolved for a year
or more, could also revive efforts to reach
a settlement among the parties. Late last
year, telecommunications companies and
the government agreed to an arrangement
in which the results of the second auction
would stand and NextWave would also be
compensated. But congressional approval
was needed, and despite intense lobbying,
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NextWave's Wireless Rights to Get High Court Scmutiny
Bloomberg News
March 4, 2002
Greg Stohr and Jonathan Cox
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
consider the Bush administration's
attempt to reclaim 63 wireless licenses
from NextWave Telecom Inc., reviving an
industrywide dispute over airwaves once
valued at $16 billion.
The justices will step into a six-year-old
fight that centers on NextWave's
bankruptcy reorganization and its efforts
to keep the airwaves that are its only
valuable asset. NextWave shares fell $3.10,
or 53 percent, to $2.80.
The court may delay a resolution of the
case for two years and comes at a bad
time for an industry that is having trouble
finding new subscribers. Companies such
as Verizon Wireless Inc. and Cingular
Wireless are looking to add capacity,
possibly by buying the NextWave
spectrum, so they can offer new services
for existing customers. "The mess just got
messier," said David Kaut, associate
analyst with Legg Mason in Washington.
"This adds a new round of litigation that a
lot of people didn't think was going to
happen. It scrambles the equation
further."
The Federal Communications
Commission wants to reinstate the results
of a second auction it held after revoking
the NextWave licenses because of missed
payments. The second auction raised
$15.9 billion from 21 carriers, including
Verizon and companies backed by AT&T
Wireless Services Inc. and Cingular.
The licenses cover metropolitan areas that
include New York, Los Angeles, Boston
and Washington.
Verizon Deposit
The justices will review an appeals court's
decision that regulators can't revoke the
licenses and must wait in line for payment
with other NextWave bankruptcy
creditors.
The court will hear appeals of that ruling
from both the Bush administration and a
group of companies that includes
Deutsche Telekom AG's VoiceStream
Wireless Corp.
Verizon at one point was pressing its own
Supreme Court petition in the NextWave
case. The company then dropped that
appeal and now wants the U.S. to give
back the $1.7 billion down payment it
made in the second auction.
"We want finality and we want our deposit
back now," Verizon Wireless spokesman
Jim Gerace said. All told, companies may
revive demands for refunds totaling $3.2
billion.
Verizon shares fell 66 cents to $47.93.
Shares of BellSouth, an owner of the
Cingular venture, rose 31 cents to $39.71.
AT&T Wireless fell 29 cents to $8.31.
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More Litigation
Supreme Court review may add two years
to the litigation. If the court were to side
with the government, the case would
return to the appellate court level, where
NextWave could press additional
arguments for keeping the spectrum. The
high court will schedule oral arguments
and rule by June of next year.
NextWave won the airwaves with a $4.7
billion bid at a 1996 auction designed to
put spectrum in the hands of fledgling
wireless companies. The value of the
frequencies quickly fell, in large part,
NextWave says, because the FCC flooded
the market with additional airwaves.
The company filed for bankruptcy
protection after paying only $500 million.
NextWave now says it can pay the full
amount.
"We are disappointed that there will be
additional litigation and the accompanying
delay to full commercial deployment of
our licenses," NextWave Senior Vice
President Michael Wack said.
NextWave last year said it had lined up
$5.5 billion in financing to build a
nationwide network. That figure includes
a $300 million investment from
Qualcomm Inc. and a $2.5 billion loan
commitment from UBS Warburg LLC.
Settlement Talks
NextWave and its more established rivals
may now enter a new round of settlement
talks, some analysts said. The Hawthorne,
New York, company may have to settle
for less than the $5 billion it would have
received under a plan last year involving
Verizon, Cingular, Sprint PCS and AT&T
Wireless.
NextWave's settlement position is now
"grossly impaired," said Christopher J.
Wright, a Washington
telecommunications and appellate lawyer
with Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis and
former FCC general counsel. "The
Supreme Court reverses about two-thirds
of the cases it hears."
Gerace, however, said Verizon Wireless
was skeptical the sides could reach a
settlement. The earlier agreement
collapsed when Congress didn't approve it
by the Dec. 31, 2001, deadline.
"We don't think another settlement is
realistic given that the FCC is really
interested in winning the case," Gerace
said.
Verizon may try to get some of the
airwaves from NextWave at a lower price,
analysts said. Mobile-hone companies
Similar Cases
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit concluded the FCC had no right to
rescind the NextWave licenses. The 3-0
ruling pointed to a provision in federal law
barring the government from revoking a
license solely because an entity "has not
paid a debt that is dischargeable" in
bankruptcy.
The government argues that the FCC
licensing rules supersede that requirement
because the agency's interests go beyond
the money it might collect.
"Only by requiring winning bidders to
make good on their bid obligations can
the commission prevent speculative or
insincere bidding," the U.S. appeal said.
NextWave urged the Supreme Court not
to hear the appeal, saying the lower court
was correct.
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The Price of FCC Integrity: $15 Billion
Wall Strretfounal
August 8, 2001
Harold Furchtgott-Roth
Earlier this year, a federal circuit court
ruled that the Federal Communications
Commission had unlawfully deprived
NextWave Telecom of wireless licenses it
had won at auction. On Monday, the
government announced it was appealing
to the Supreme Court.
Government officials claim the appeal is
necessary to preserve the "integrity of the
auction process" by which the licenses
were assigned. While there are doubtlessly
many reasons the government has
appealed the decision, integrity is not one
of them. The primary reason for the
appeal is money, and lots of it.
If it stands, the lower-court decision
means the sudden disappearance of more
than $15 billion in federal receipts--money
the FCC made by rashly reauctioning
NextWave's licenses before the court
decisions. Federal government circles are
abuzz with the problem of how to make
up the shortfall. But the real scandal is
why the government ever risked its own
integrity to trample property rights.
As required by a new law, the FCC began
auctioning rights for licenses among
competing parties in the mid-1990s. A
simple auction process as required by law
would be difficult to violate, but the FCC
tarnished the integrity of the process by
allowing winning bidders to pay through
installments, a method not required by
law.
NextWave, a once-and-future wireless
company, sought bankruptcy protection
after having acquired many wireless
licenses in auctions, but having only
partially paid for them. The government
and NextWave went to court. The
government claimed that, by nonpayment
of debt, NextWave forfeited the licenses.
NextWave claimed the rights to the
licenses remained its property in
bankruptcy court. The federal government
tried different tacks in a series of court
battles. But after the recent circuit court's
unusually stinging decision in favor of
NextWave, the government is looking at
very long odds by appealing to the
Supreme Court.
To complicate matters further, the FCQ
in the middle of litigation, recklessly
reauctioned the disputed NextWave
licenses--over objections from both inside
and outside the agency. A champion of
the integrity of the auction process--as the
FCC now claims to be--would not have
held the auction for at least three reasons.
First, the FCC did not have clear legal
control of the licenses; pending litigation
might, and subsequently did, return them
to NextWave. The FCC even stipulated to
the court that, should NextWave prevail,
it would receive the licenses.
Second, the litigation was expected to end
in a matter of months, giving little reason
not to wait for legal resolution.
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Third, the mere spectacle of auctioning
property of dubious legal ownership
would frighten away legitimate bidders.
And those who would participate in such
an auction would doubtless bid less than
they would if the commission had clear
title. Even if the FCC were to have won in
court, American taxpayers would have
been better off if it had waited to get clear
title.
Companies such as Verizon, VoiceStreaim,
and new affiliates of AT&T and Cingular
bid in excess of $15 billion for the rights
to the NextWave licenses. The auction
participants were betting that the FCC
would ultimately prevail in court, but they
calibrated their bids downward to account
for the legal risk. Some tried to reduce the
risk by making substantial efforts to
buttress the FCC's doomed position in
court.
The prospect of money blurred legal and
even moral decisions. Not only did the
FCC vigorously promote and support the
reauction, but other parts of the federal
government did as well. The Department
of Justice helped with litigation. The
budget agencies treated the winning bids,
which were little more than lottery tickets,
as if they were money in the bank.
Unfortunately, a government that yielded
to temptation rather than better judgment
has yet to grasp the errors of its ways.
Governmental discussions have not
revolved around how to compensate
NextWave or the parties induced to
participate in what courts have now ruled
to be an unlawful auction. No, the
government's foremost concern seems to
be how it will fill the $15 billion shortfall.
The FCC is reportedly considering
offering NextWave some money to go
away. The implicit threat is that, if
NextWave declines a lowball offer, it will
suffer a death by a thousand cuts in the
regulatory process.
It is not too late for the government to
redeem itself. Salvation rests not in
finding some or all of the $15 billion it
never owned. Rather, redemption comes
when it sobers up and answers a harder
question: Why was it recklessly gambling
on its integrity and moral authority in the
first instance?
Copyright D 2001 Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
241
New Kids on the Block; PCS Challenges Cellular Duopoly
RCR Wless News
July 30, 2001
Kristen Beckman
The cellular industry was barely 10 years
old when competitors started knocking on
the door. In the early 1990s, Nextel
Communications Inc. was amassing
specialized mobile radio licenses and
formulating a digital plan to make it a
serious threat to cellular carriers.
Meanwhile, a new brand of services was in
its infancy-personal communications
services.
PCS has its roots in Great Britain. The
Department of Trade and Industry in
1989 published "Phones on the Move," an
outline of a personal, wireless
telecommunications service that would
compete with cellular and other existing
mobile services. In June 1989, the British
government awarded three companies
licenses to initiate two-way wireless
communications services using Groupe
Speciale Mobile communications
technology.
A handful of U.S. companies borrowed
the British idea and obtained licenses to
test the new services here. APC and PCN
America petitioned the Federal
Communications Commission to allocate
spectrum for PCS, which envisioned an
all-digital network providing
improvements in service quality. Tom
Stroup, a former president of the Personal
Communications Industry Association,
was involved with trying to free spectrum
at the FCC for PCS. While Stroup said the
process of getting spectrum allocated was
arduous, he said the commission was
receptive to the idea, and the proposal was
moved through the process as quickly as
could be hoped given the size of the
spectrum and the task of getting all the
commissioners to agree on it.
"Certainly there were lots of intra-industry
battles as to how many licenses should be
allocated, whether there should be
preferences, whether there should be
restrictions on the amount of spectrum
any one company could obtain," said
Stroup.
The FCC allocated 220 megahertz of
spectrum in the 1.8 GHz to 2.2 GHz
band for PCS in January 1992, and
included in its framework a provision for
including entrepreneurs. It also awarded
pioneer's preference licenses to PCS
innovators including American Personal
Communications, Cox Enterprises and
Omnipoint Corp.
On Dec. 5, 1995, the government kicked
off the A- and B-block broadband PCS
auction, attracting a variety of bidders
including Craig McCaw, who later
dropped out. AirTouch, Bell Atlantic,
Nynex and U S West banded together to
bid on licenses under the name PrimeCo,
and Sprint joined with cable giants
Comcast Corp., Cox Communications
Inc. and Tele-Communications Inc. to bid
for licenses under the WirelessCo name.
The auction, which drew 18 bidders,
lasted three months and netted $7 billion
for 99 licenses. The big winners at the
auction included WirelessCo, which
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walked away with 29 markets for $2.1
billion; AT&T, which bid $1.68 billion for
21 markets; and PCS PrimeCo, which bid
$1.1 billion for 11 markets.
Energized by its initial success, the FCC
was anxious to begin the Gblock auction,
which was set aside for entrepreneurs, but
it was hampered by legal challenges. After
several fits and starts, the Cblock auction
finally began one year later.
But prices quickly skyrocketed in the C
block auction, and many players were
forced to drop out. The auction officially
brought in $10.2 billion, $4.2 billion of
which was committed by NextWave
Personal Communications Inc., the largest
bidder in the auction. The other notable
winners in the Gblock auction were DCR
PCS Inc., GWI, BDPCS, Omnipoint,
Chase PCS 2000, 21st Century, Wireless
PCS and Urban. Questions immediately
followed about how winners would pay
for their new licenses. Companies began
defaulting on their down payments within
weeks. The eventual fallout from the
auction included defaults, bankruptcies
and re-auctions that continue to haunt the
wireless industry today.
The final three blocks of PCS spectrum
were auctioned off in the fall of 1996.
"The interesting thing from my
perspective was bringing people with a
background in auction theory in to speak
to our members and giving them an idea
what to expect," said Stroup, who is now
president and chief executive officer of
GroupServe Inc. "It was amazing to me
how many of the things that were
predicted came true, in terms of how it
becomes an emotional process, how it's so
easy to overbid for spectrum or for
anything."
Meanwhile, APC commercially launched
its PCS network on Nov. 15, 1995, in
Washington, D.C, marking the beginning
of the commercial PCS industry. Newly
licensed PCS players had a significant
challenge before them in trying to
differentiate their service offering from
those of the incumbent cellular carriers.
"The cellular industry was doing
everything it could to stop it from
happening," said Jay Kitchen, PCIA's
president and CEO. "They did not want
PCS to develop because it was
competition, and they knew if they got
competition it would drive the price down
and their (return on investment) would
drop dramatically as well. The cellular
industry had its foot squarely on the air
hose of the PCS industry."
Cellular carriers rushed to improve their
systems to prepare for PCS competition.
Opinions about how the new PCS service
would fare varied, and some believed PCS
wouldn't be able to compete head-on with
cellular.
"The big challenge was when they turned
on their systems, they were going to be
competing with two companies that had
some pretty good systems built out, and
so they needed to be creative about how
they positioned themselves," said Stroup.
The most immediate impact of new PCS
competition was falling prices. PCS
carriers entered the market with prices
from 10 to 40 percent below cellular
prices. PCS carriers also eliminated service
contracts, which had been a mainstay in
the cellular industry. Unable to match up
with their cellular counterparts on
coverage, PCS carriers focused instead on
the messages of better quality, more
features and better security with their
services.
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The PCS players faced other challenges as
well. For the first time, carriers had to pay
for licenses and bidders had to build a
business plan based on forecasts of
penetration and airtime rates for a service
that had never before been offered.
Once they got licenses, PCS carriers were
required to share in the cost of relocating
microwave users that occupied the
spectrum. PCIA established a cost-sharing
structure that required the second and
third carriers coming on to the
frequencies to reimburse the first carrier
for expenses they incurred while moving
the microwave licensees off the
frequencies, said Kitchen. PCIA also
established a clearinghouse that identified
more than a quarter of a billion dollars in
cost-sharing obligations among PCS
players.
Carriers also had to get systems
against a cellular industry that had
year head start.
built
a 10-
to expand, was a challenge," said Stroup.
"Just trying to find RF engineers was
almost impossible."
Many PCS players were able to
differentiate and ultimately contributed to
the overall growth of the wireless industry.
"I think PCS has had tremendous impact,
probably one of the most far-reaching
impacts of anything that's happened in the
wireless industry to date," said Kitchen. "It
introduced a new technology, the most
up-to-date digital technology at the time.
It created competition, and through that
competition, it drove prices down."
"The competition has created an
environment for better service and also
new service offerings, and I think we're
going to see that continue as we go into
this new generation," said Kitchen.
Copyright 0 2001 Crain Communications,
Inc. RCR Wireless News
"The cellular carriers had the luxury of
building out their systems more
incrementally," said Stroup. "They
received a substantial size territory and
typically built from the core market
outward. They really didn't face any
competition other than the other carrier in
the market.
"The PCS carriers really did not have that
luxury," said Stroup. "They really needed
to turn on a system with a wide footprint."
That created an additional problem for
new PCS entrants-the ability to gather
increasingly scarce resources needed to get
their systems built.
"Trying to find people to handle the many
aspects of building out as many systems as
were under construction at one time, in
addition to the cellular industry continuing
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01-1243 Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Ruling Below: (Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 9 th Cir., 261
F.3d 810, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 18364, 52 ERC (BNA) 2025, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service
7056, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 8683, 32 ELR 20011.)
The court held that deep ripping disgorged large amounts of soil into protected wetlands and
caused the destruction of those wetlands. Deep ripping was not the same as normal
plowing, which would be exempt under the Clean Water Act. Tsakopoulos was in violation
of the Clean Water Act, and could be penalized for each violation of the Act, not just each
day he conducted activities violating the Act.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether deep ripping in a wetlands for farming purposes may
result in a discharge of a pollutant for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et
seq.
(2) Whether each day in violation or each act in violation of the Clean Water Act should be
counted in determining the maximum civil penalty under Section 309(d) of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319(d).
BORDEN RANCH PARTNERSHIP; Angelo L Tsakopoulos, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; United States Environmental
Protection Agency, an agency of the United States, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 15, 2001
HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns the authority of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("the
Corps") and the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") over a form
of agricultural activity called "deep
ripping" when it occurs in wetlands. We
conclude that the Clean Water Act applies
to this activity and affirm the district
court's findings that Borden Ranch
violated the Act by deep ripping in
protected wetland swales. We reverse the
district court's findings of liability with
respect to isolated vernal pools in light of
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576, 121 S. Ct.
675 (2001), and remand for a recalculation
of the civil penalties.
Facts and Procedural Background
[Borden Ranch was primarily used as
rangeland for cattle, and contained a wide
vanety of aquatic habitats, including
pools, wetlands, and drainage. These
habitats depend on a layer of soil called
the "restrictive layer" which keeps water
from sinking deep into the earth.
Tsakopoulos bought the ranch and
planned to convert it into vineyards and
orchards, which require penetration
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through the restrictive layer. To
accomplish this penetration, a process
called "deep ripping" is used to disgorge
the soil. A tractor pulls metal prongs
between four and seven feet long through
the earth.
The Clean Water Act requires individuals
who wish to fill wetlands to get approval
from the Corps. Tsakopoulos began
without approval, but got retroactive
permission, with limitations. Tsakopoulos
went beyond the scope of the permit and
was ordered to cease deep ripping after
the Corp discovered his violation.
Tsakopoulos continued to conduct deep
ripping in violation of various agreements
the Corp and EPA made with him. The
EPA issued and Administrative Order to
Tsakopoulos. In response he filed this
lawsuit challenging the authority of the
Corps and the EPA to regulated deep
ripping. The United States filed suit in
return.]
Analysis
I. Corps Jurisdiction over Deep Ripping
[The Clean Water Act prohibits the
discharge of any type of pollutant, even
soil, into the nation's waters, including
wetlands near navigable rives. A permit
from the Corps is required to conduct any
such discharge.]
A. Discharge of a Pollutant
Tsakopoulos initially contends that deep
ripping cannot constitute the "addition"
of a "pollutant "into wetlands, because it
simply chums up soil that is already there,
placing it back basically where it came
from. This argument is inconsistent with
Ninth Circuit precedent and with case law
from other circuits that squarely hold that
redeposits of materials can constitute an
"addition of a pollutant" under the Clean
Water Act. Ryadbek v United State EnztL
Pnt Ageny, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990),
considered a claim that placer mining
activities were exempt from the Act. We
held that removing material from a stream
bed, sifting out the gold, and returning the
material to the stream bed was an"
addition" of a "pollutant." Id. at 1285. The
term" pollutant" encompassed "the
materials segregated from gold in placer
mining." Id.
Our reasoning in Ryachek is similar to
that of the Fourth Circuit in United State v
Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000). In
Deaton, a property owner alleged that the
Corps could not regulate "sidecasting,"
which is" the deposit of dredged or
excavated material from a wetland back
into that same wetland." Id. at 334. The
property owner asserted that "sidecasting
results in no net increase in the amount of
material present in the wetland" and
therefore could not constitute the
"addition of a pollutant." Id. at 335. The
Fourth Circuit squarely rejected this
argument, in language that is worth
quoting in full:
Contrary to what the Deatons suggest, the
statute does not prohibit the addition of
material; it prohibits the "addition of any
pollutant." The idea that there could be an
addition of a pollutant without an addition
of material seems to us entirely
unremarkable, at least when an activity
transforms some material from a
nonpollutant into a pollutant, as occurred
here ....
These cases recognize that activities that
destroy the ecology of a wetland are not
immune from the Clean Water Act merely
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because they do not involve the
introduction of material brought in from
somewhere else. In this case, the Corps
alleges that Tsakopoulos has essentially
poked a hole in the bottom of protected
wetlands. That is, by ripping up the
bottom layer of soil, the water that was
trapped can now drain out. While it is
true, that in so doing, no new material has
been "added," a "pollutant" has certainly
been "added." Prior to the deep ripping,
the protective layer of soil was intact,
holding the wetland in place. Afterwards,
that soil was wrenched up, moved around,
and redeposited somewhere else. We can
see no meaningful distinction between
this activity and the activities at issue in
Rybadek and Deatan. We therefore
conclude that deep ripping, when
undertaken in the context at issue here,
can constitute a discharge of a pollutant
under the Clean Water Act.
Tsakopoulos also contends that no case
has ever held a plow to be a point source,
and that a prohibited discharge must be
from a point source. This argument has
no merit. The statutory definition of
"point source" ("any discernible, confined,
and discrete conveyance") is extremely
broad, 33 U.S.C 5 1362(14), and courts
have found that" bulldozers and
backhoes" can constitute "point sources, "
Awwyzs, 715 F.2d at 922. In this case,
bulldozers and tractors were used to pull
large metal prongs through the soil. We
can think of no reason why this
combination would not satisfy the
definition of a "point source."
B. The Normal Farming Exception
Tsakopoulos next contends, that even if
deep ripping constitutes a discharge of
pollutants, it is nonetheless exempt from
regulation under the "farming exceptions,
"which state that discharges "from normal
farming ... and ranching activities, such as
plowing' are not subject to the Clean
Water Act. 33 U.S.C, 5 1344(f)(1)(A). The
section of the statute containing the
farming exceptions, however, includes a
significant qualifying provision:
Any discharge of dredged or fill material
into the navigable waters incidental to any
activity having as its purpose bringing an
area of the navigable waters into a use to
which it was not previously subject, where
the flow or circulation of navigable waters
may be impaired or the reach of such
waters be reduced, shall be required to
have a permit under this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). Thus, even normal
plowing can be regulated under the Clean
Water Act if it falls under this so-called
"recapture" provision. See Avoyelles, 715
F.2d at 925 (noting that 5 1344(f)(2) can
preclude the normal farming exceptions).
We conclude that the deep ripping at issue
in this case is governed by the recapture
provision. Converting ranch land to
orchards and vineyards is clearly bringing
the land" into a use to which it was not
previously subject," and there is a clear
basis in this record to conclude that the
destruction of the soil layer at issue here
constitutes an impairment of the flow of
nearby navigable waters.
Although the Corps cannot regulate a
farmer who desires "merely to change
from one wetland crop to another,"
activities that require "substantial
hydrological alterations" require a permit.
Unitd States vA kem, 785 F.2d 814, 820
(9th Cir. 1986). As we have explained,
"the intent of Congress in enacting the
Act was to prevent conversion of
wetlands to dry lands[.]"
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II. The Vernal Pool
[The court found that because of the
recent Supreme Court ruling in Sdid
Waste, the Corps had no authority over
one of the isolated pools at issue here.]
III. The District Court's Factual Findings
[The court recounted the evidence
presented in the district court and found
no clear error to support Tsakopoulos'
claim that there was no evidence to
support the district court's factual findings
of deep ripping in protected swales.]
IV. The Civil Penalty
The district court found that Tsakopoulos
had committed 358 violations of the
Clean Water Act. It counted each pass of
the ripper through a protected wetland as
a separate violation. The statute provides
for a maximum penalty of"$ 25,000 per
day for each violation." 33 U.S.C. 5 1319.
The statutory maximum penalty was
therefore $ 8,950,000. The court then
considered a variety of factors in setting
the penalty. The court found that
Tsakopoulos "risked damaging rare
federal wetlands because of his motivation
to reap economic gain." The court also
found an "absence of a good faith attempt
to comply with the Act." The court
accordingly set the penalty at $ 1,500,000,
which is $ 7,450,000 below the statutory
maximum. The court also allowed
Tsakopoulos to suspend $ 1,000,000 of
the penalty if he performed various
restoration measures.
Tsakopoulos now makes three challenges
to the district court's calculation of the
civil penalty. We conclude that none of
these arguments has menit.
A. Penalty Calculation per Violation
Tsakopoulos first contends that the
penalty should have been based on the
number of days in which illegal ripping
occurred, not on the number of individual
passes with the ripper. He argues that the
statutory language "per day for each
violation" means that he can only be
assessed $ 25,000 for any day in which
ripping violations occurred, regardless of
the total number of rippings in that day.
We disagree. The statute imposes a
maximum penalty" per day for each
violation." 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d). It does
not say "per each day in which violations
occur" or" per day in which a party
pollutes." The focus is clearly on each
violation, and courts have consistently
rejected attempts to limit civil penalties to
the number of days in which violations
occur. A contrary rule would encourage
individuals to stack all their violations into
one "Pollution Day," in which
innumerable offenses could occur, subject
only to the $ 25,000 maximum.
This case is about repeated filling of
wetlands without a permit. Here, the
landowner committed the same unlawful
act repeatedly. Tsakopoulos argues that
treating each rip as a separate violation
could lead to nonsensical results in other
cases. For example, a polluter who
emitted 25,000 gallons of a pollutant into
a stream continuously over the course of a
day would be subject to a $ 25,000
maximum penalty, whereas a polluter who
made three separate discharges of one
gallon each would be subject to a $ 75,000
maximum penalty.
Tsakopoulos's position, however, also
leads to irrational results. The incentive
problems at issue in Smithfield are equally
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strong here. Once a wetland violation has
occurred in part of a swale, Tsakopoulos's
proposed rule would allow the landowner
to rip away at the rest of the swale with
impunity from that point forward,
because no additional penalty could be
imposed.
Although neither approach is free from
difficulty, we believe the better rule is to
treat each rip as a separate violation. This
approach is more consistent with the
statutory language, with prior judicial
interpretations of the statute, and with the
general policy goal of discouraging
pollution. Tsakopoulos's concern about
the disparate treatment of the polluter
who emits several small amounts and the
serial continuous polluter is not without
remedy in the district courts. The district
courts have substantial discretion in
imposing penalties, and, as the GudtnEy
court pointed out in response to a similar
argument, the district court "could
...impose a substantially smaller penalty on
[the] hypothetical polluter than on [the
larger polluter]." 791 F.2d at 315.
In sum, we conclude that the district court
correctly included each pass of the ripper
as a separate violation. A limited remand
for recalculation of the penalty is
nonetheless in order. The district court
included 10 passes through the vernal
pool in its total of 358 violations. Since
the government now concedes that it
lacks jurisdiction over these violations, we
remand to the district court to determine
what, if any, reduction in the penalty is
appropnate.
B. The Simpson Timber Consent Decree
Tsakopoulos argues that the penalty
imposed here is significantly
disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in the settlement of violations by the
Simpson Timber Company, which deep
ripped 987 acres, but was subject only to a
$ 30,000 penalty and a restoration order.
[ ... I
The district court did not abuse its
discretion. Tsakopoulos knowingly
assumed the risk that litigation would
result in a judgment more unfavorable
than he might have attained through
settlement. [... I
C. Further Reductions in Penalty
Tsakopoulos finally argues that the district
court should have reduced the penalty
further because of Tsakopoulos's good
faith, the trivial nature of the violations,
and the supposed uncertainty concerning
the government's regulatory authority.
The district court considered these
arguments when setting the penalty (a
penalty that was significantly lower than
the statutory maximum). None of
Tsakopoulos's arguments rises to the level
necessary to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion by the district court.
Conclusion
We affirm the district court's holding that
deep ripping in this context is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA.
We also affirm the district court's factual
findings except with respect to the vernal
pools. We remand for a recalculation of
the civil penalties. Finally, we deny
Tsakopoulos's request that this case be
assigned to a different district judge on
remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED. Costs on appeal to
appellees.
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GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The crux of this
case is that a farmer has plowed deeply to
improve his farm property to permit
farming of fruit crops that require deep
root systems, and are more profitable than
grazing or other prior farm use. Farmers
have been altering and transforming their
crop land from the beginning of our
nation, and indeed in colornal times.
Although I have no doubt that Congress
could have reached and regulated the
farming activity challenged, that does not
in itself show that Congress so exercised
its power. I conclude that the Clean Water
Act does not prohibit "deep ripping" in
this setting.
I would follow and extend National Mining
A ssociation u U.S. A rrny Cops of E ngirms,
330 U.S. App. D.C. 329, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998), and hold that the return
of soil in place after deep plowing is not a
"discharge of a pollutant." In Natiamd
Minin the court held that the Corps
exceeded its authority under section 404
of the Clean Water Act by regulating the
redeposit of dredged materials that
incidentally fall back in the course of
dredging operations. The court explained
that "the straightforward statutory term
'addition' cannot reasonably be said to
encompass the situation in which material
is removed from the waters of the United
States and a small portion of it happens to
fall back." 145 F.3d at 1404. [... ]
Those considerations are persuasive here
as deep ripping does not involve any
significant removal or "addition" of
material to the site. The ground is plowed
and transformed. It is true that the
hydrological regime is modified, but
Congress spoke in terms of discharge or
addition of pollutants, not in terms of
change of the hydrological nature of the
soil. If Congress intends to prohibit so
natural a farm activity as plowing, and
even the deep plowing that occurred here,
Congress can and should be explicit.
Although we interpret the prohibitions of
the Clean Water Act to effectuate
Congressional intent, it is an undue stretch
for us, absent a more clear directive from
Congress, to reach and prohibit the
plowing done here, which seems to be a
traditional form of farming activity.
[The dissent distinguished Rybadxe from
this case. The miners in Ryadxde were
removing soil from the waterways, sifting
it, and the discharging the remaining soil
back into the water. This dumping
required geographical movement of the
materials for a certain period of time. The
deep ripping neither moves material any
distance nor displaces the material for any
period of time.]
Nor is the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331
(4th Cir. 2000), relied on by the majority,
persuasive to me in the context presented.
A farmer who plows deeply is not, in my
view, redepositing dredged or excavated
materials. While the Fourth Circuit relied
on the fact that a "dredged spoil" is a
statutory pollutant, the deep plowing
activity here, in my view, is not the same
as dredging dirt from and redepositing it
in waters.
Also, even assuming that deep ripping can
be viewed as a discharge of a pollutant
into navigable waters, it seems at first
consideration exempt as a normal farming
activity. The Clean Water Act exempts
normal farming activity, including
plowing. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A).
The exemption as cast by Congress is not
limited to shallow plowing, but would
appear literally to cover the deep plowing
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technique referred to as deep ripping. This
exemption, however, does not apply by its
terms to "any activity having as its
purpose bringing an area of the navigable
waters into a use to which it was not
previously subject." See 33 U.S.C.
1344(f)(2). Moreover, the Corps of
Engineers, by regulation, has provided
explicitly that the plowing exemption does
not include "redistribution of soil, rock,
sand, or other surficial materials in a
manner which changes any area of the
waters of the United States to dry land."
33 C.F.R. 5 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D). The Corp's
regulation, which we upheld in United
Stata u Aken, 785 F.2d 814, 819-20 (9th
Cir. 1986), must be read consistent with
the statute's terms. Although this
limitation defeats the exemption for any
deep ripping that had the purpose of
transforming land, it does not, in my view,
defeat the exemption as to any unintended
impairment. Most violations found by the
district court involved a purposeful
attempt to transform the land. But some
of the transgressions (indentations in
swales caused by moving the deep ripper
to different locations) found by the
district court here were apparently
unintentional, or at least there was no
finding by the district court of purposeful
modification as to all of the violations.
I would hold that the district court erred
in finding that the activities here required
a permit and otherwise violated the Clean
Water Act. The problem of interpretation
here arises because Congress prohibited
the discharge or addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source.
It did not literally prohibit any conduct by
farmers or ranchers that changes the
hydrological character of their land. The
majority opinion, motivated perhaps by
the purposes of the statute, makes new
law by concluding that a plow is a point
source and that deep ripping includes
discharge of pollutants into protected
waters. The policy decision involved here
should be made by Congress, which has
the ability to study and the power to make
such fine distinctions. [... ] The
alternatives are an agency power too
unbounded or judicial law-making, which
is worse. I respectfully dissent.
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Farm Case Wins High Court Review
Scriops Howard News Service
June 11, 2002
Denny Walsh
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday
to review a face-off between Sacramento
developer Angelo Tsakopoulos and
federal environmental regulators that
could change the way the Gean Water Act
is applied to the nation's farmers.
The case involves deeper than normal
plowing called "deep ripping" that
Tsakopoulos employed to convert
thousands of acres of rangeland at his
Borden Ranch near Galt to fruit crops.
Two lower courts found that the plowing
destroyed seasonal wetlands protected by
the Clean Water Act.
At issue is whether plowing, at whatever
depth, constitutes a "discharge" of fill
material or the addition of a "pollutant"
into drainages defined by the act as waters
of the United States. The other issue is
whether plowing is exempt by statute as a
"normal farming activity."
Tsakopoulos and his daughter, Eleni
Tsakopoulos-Kounalakis, said they were
pleased by the Supreme Court's action.
"We believe it is critically important to
farmers across the country that the
government's desire to regulate how deep
we set our plow be overturned," said
Tsakopoulos-Kounalakisshe, who is
serving as a spokeswoman for her father
in the matter.
The multibillion-dollar agriculture industry
is looking to the case to tell it where deep-
root crops may be planted.
The high court does not disclose vote
counts on whether to accept cases for
review. All of the justices review requests,
and four of the nine must be in favor.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who is from
Sacramento, "took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition,"
according to a notation on the court's
Monday order list. Kennedy is "an
acquaintance" of the Tsakopoulos family,
according to Tsakopoulos-Kounalakis.
Deep ripping, which penetrates a dense
layer of soil called a "restrictive layer" or
"clay pan," has been used by Tsakopoulos
since 1993 to turn pastureland into
vineyards and orchards on the 8,400-acre
ranch that straddles the Sacramento
County-San Joaquin County line.
He and his lawyers have consistently
argued that long-established farming
practices should be immune from the
meddling of regulators and have from the
beginning cast the legal battle as "a
national test case." When he sued the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and
Environmental Protection Agency more
than five years ago, Tsakopoulos vowed
to take his challenge to the Supreme
Court, if necessary.
A split three-judge panel of the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals last year affirmed
U.S. District Judge Garland E. Burrell Jr.'s
finding that deep plowing is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers and
the EPA, and there must be prior
approval by the Corps.
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The Pacific Legal Foundation, the
California Farm Bureau Federation and
the California Cattlemen's Association
filed a joint brief with the appellate court
in support of Tsakopoulos. The American
Farm Bureau Federation and the National
Association of Home Builders also
weighed in on his side.
Upon learning of Mondays action by the
Supreme Court, Tsakopoulos attorney
Arthur Coon said the case "presents a
tremendous opportunity for the high
court to stem the creeping tide of
regulatory overreaching. We strongly
believe Congress never intended to
require a farmer or rancher to obtain a
federal permit merely to plant new crops."
Coon said he expects the matter to be
argued by the end of the year and is
hopeful an opinion will come down by
next June.
After years of bitter debate with the Corps
of Engineers and the EPA, Tsakopoulos
sought a court determination. The
government countersued, claiming he had
violated the act by deep plowing without a
permit.
Following a three-week, nonjury trial,
Burrell ruled in 1999 that Tsakopoulos
had violated the act 348 times by deep
ripping through 29 drainages, and on 10
occasions by ripping a vernal pool.
The judge gave Tsakopoulos the option of
paying a $1.5 million civil fine or paying
$500,000 and restoring four acres of
wetlands.
Tsakopoulos chose the latter and
appealed.
The circuit panel reversed Burrell only
with respect to the vernal pool, citing a
2001 Supreme Court opinion. Based on
that aspect of its decision, the panel
remanded the case to Burrell for a
recalculation of the fine.
But Tsakopoulos' petition to the
court kept it from returning
Sacramento.
high
to
Copyright 0 2002 Scripps Howard, Inc
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Soil Case Could Cut Wide Swath
United Pirss Intenational
June 10, 2002
Michael Kirkland
The Supreme Court said Monday it would
review the scope of the Clean Water Act
in regard to displaced soil, particularly an
agricultural preparation practice known as
"deep nippmig."
The National Association of Home
Builders, however, said the issue goes
beyond agriculture, and would affect a
"vast spectrum of soil movements."
The case being reviewed by the Supreme
Court comes from central California.
Though not yet scheduled, it should be
heard by the justices sometime next fall.
The dispute involves the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Army Corps of
Engineers and their assertion of
jurisdiction over a farmer's plowing
practices. A lower court upheld the
agencies' jurisdiction.
"Based on the agencies' past response to
judicial decisions," the National
Association of Home Builders said in a
support brief filed with the Supreme
Court, "NAHB submits that the Corps
and EPA will attempt to use the (lower
court's ruling) to justify federal regulation
over a vast spectrum of soil movements
(not just plowing) in all (Clean Water Act)
jurisdictional waters.
"Indeed, a joint Corps/EPA regulation
issued in January 2001 currently (and
illegally) 'regards' that an 'earth-moving
activity' caused by a machine results in a
statutory 'discharge' and thus requires a
(Clean Water Act) permit," the brief said.
In asking for Supreme Court intervention,
California's Borden Ranch said the
"fundamental issue in this case is whether
a farmer and rancher may deeply plow his
agriculturally zoned ranchland to plant
higher value crops without need of a
federal permit or ... whether the Corps has
jurisdiction to regulate such traditional
farming activity under the federal Clean
Water Act."
A petition from the ranch partnership
complains the "Corps asserts such
jurisdiction in this case and others,
contending the traditional farming activity
of plowing alone of dry ground in areas of
seasonal wetlands constitutes the
'discharge' of 'pollutants' .... "
The 8,400-acre Borden Ranch is in both
Sacramento and San Joaquin counties. It
is bisected by Dry Creek, which also
serves as the county line.
The ranch was bought in 1993 by a
partnership and the current general
partner, Angelo Tsakopoulos.
Court records say Tsakopoulos wanted to
convert rangeland into vineyards and
orchards, then subdivide the land into
smaller parcels for sale. Vineyards and
orchards require deep root systems.
"Their cultivation therefore requires 'deep
ripping,' a process in which bulldozers
drag rippers, consisting of 4-foot to 7-foot
metal prongs, through the earth," the
Justice Department said in a brief filed on
behalf of the EPA and the Corps. "That
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activity breaks up the restrictive layer and
disgorges rock, sand and biological
material behind the ripper .... Deep
ripping alters the movement of surface
and subsurface water and limits or
destroys the ability of wetlands to retain
water."
Even though Tsakopoulos knew when he
purchased Borden Ranch that it contained
wetlands protected by the Clean Water
Act, and he was told by the Corps he
would need a permit, he began deep
ripping without a permit several times
over a number of years, the Justice
Department told the Supreme Court.
The Corps twice issued a "cease and
desist" order without effect, the
department said. When the EPA issued an
administrative order saying Tsakopoulos
had violated the Clean Water Act in 1997,
Tsakopoulos and the Borden Ranch
Partnership filed suit in federal court
challenging the authority of the Corps and
the EPA to regulate deep ripping.
A federal judge dismissed their claims and
gave Tsakopoulos a choice of paying a
$1.5 million civil penalty or paying
$500,000 and restoring four acres of
wetlands. He chose the latter pending
appeal.
A federal appeals court largely upheld the
judge, reversing only a violation involving
an isolated pool.
Tsakopoulos and the Borden Ranch
Partnership then asked the Supreme Court
for review.
Copyright * 2002 U.P.I.
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01-0963 Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers
Ruling Below: Plaintiffs charged that Norfolk & Western Railway Co. had caused
emotional distress through fear of cancer due to the presence of asbestos in their workplace.
The court instructed jurors not to consider factors other than their asbestos exposure that
could have contributed to the employees' fear of cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs for $5.8 million. The Supreme Court of West Virginia declined to hear the
appeal.
Questions Presented: (1) Was it error for the court below to award emotional distress
damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to retired employees who alleged
workplace exposure to asbestos, but who presented no evidence of physical manifestation or
other corroboration of injury related to their alleged fear of cancer?
(2) Was it error for the court below not to apportion damages under the FELA among
tortfeasors?
Decision Unpublished
Circuit Court of West Virginia
for Kanawha County
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The Real-life Tragedy of the Asbestos Theatre
Financial Times
May 14, 2002
Amity Shales
By now most observers are accustomed to
America's tort theatre. We know all the
players: the swaggering trial lawyers, the
sheepish corporations that are forced to
empty their deep pockets, the Robin
Hood juries that hand out cash as a form
of redistributive justice.
But for sheer unpredictability and scale,
nothing can thrill like asbestos. In what
other tort drama do the actors reach out
and collar unsuspecting members of the
audience (Halliburton, the energy services
company, being the flamboyant example)?
Even though asbestos, the mineral, has
disappeared from new buildings and
products the government banned its use
decades ago cases are proliferating. Last
year about 90,000 new claims were filed
against companies, three times the rate
just a couple of years ago. Defendant
companies that have had little or nothing
to do with asbestos routinely go bankrupt
after being hit with a penalty. And much
of the cash is going to lawyers and people
who are unimpaired.
The history of asbestos jurisprudence is
worth recalling, if only for what it tells us
about the common law. This system, with
its incremental establishment of precedent
through case law, is part of the Anglo-
American tradition of freedom. Yet here it
has been revamped into a monster with a
tyranny all its own.
Just decades ago, asbestos seemed a
manageable problem. On the one hand
there were the visibly injured those who
suffered from mesothelioma, a fatal
cancer, and asbestosis, an emphysema-like
condition whose illness was caused by
asbestos. These were mostly workers who
had substantial exposure over years
wartime dock workers and pipefitters. On
the defendant side, only a few companies
were vulnerable: the 300 or so US
companies that mined asbestos or sold
asbestos products. As with other law
regarding toxic substances, state statutes
of limitations applied: cases had to be filed
within two or three years from the time of
injury.
But asbestos disease has a latency period
that can run into decades and so some of
the injured were unable to sue. Most states
thus altered their statutes, so that the
clock began running only when people
became aware of their disease.
This sounded logical but in turn begat a
second problem: plaintiffs began to flood
the legal system. What is more, the body
of plaintiffs was no longer confined to
those with evident physical impairment
from asbestos. Now many of the litigants
and soon the majority - were unimpaired
or only mildly impaired. Courts and juries
began to grant large injury awards merely
on the basis of smaller exposure, thus
enriching many who will never experience
asbestos disease.
Meanwhile, plaintiff lawyers, with
acquiescence from judges, began doing
what they could to expand the theory of
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what constituted injury. The US Supreme
Court has just agreed to review another
such case: Norfolk & Western Railway Co
v Freeman Ayers, in which a West
Virginia jury awarded six retired railway
workers $5.8m because of "emotional
distress" over fear of cancer after
exposure to asbestos.
What a contrast to the UK, where the
House of Lords is deliberating whether
Edwin Matthews, a plaintiff, may recover
anything if it is not clear which company
was responsible.
Desperate to stanch the flooding of their
dockets, judges in the US took yet another
unusual step: they began to allow a form
of mass consolidation that is not
permitted in most classic tort categories in
the US. "Bananas go with bananas" was
the old rule of class action, says Victor
Schwartz, co-author of the classic tort
text,Prosser, Wade and Schwartz. Now
judges were grouping apples (unimpaired
possible casualties) with oranges (workers
with diagnosed mesothelioma) in the same
suit.
In order to stave off even larger
settlements for the dying plaintiffs, judges
and juries allowed awards to the entire
group. By making litigation efficient, they
encouraged more of it.
On the companies' side, the law likewise
shifted. The traditional defendants that
mined asbestos and sold asbestos product
were almost all gone. So the plaintiffs' Bar
began to take advantage of "the joint and
several liability" doctrine that is especially
strong in certain corners of the US. In
those venues, a company need only to be
proven responsible for a small share of an
injury in order to be fully liable for its
costs. Soon nearly any company with a
connection to asbestos found itself
ensnared.
It would be easy to blame this tragedy on
the tort shark lawyers, who, often
unscrupulously and perhaps sometimes
illegally, profit from the suits. Lester
Brickman, a professor at Yeshiva
University's Cardozo School of Law, has
pushed for the aggressive prosecution of
some of these fellows (the charge would
be suborning perjury). The judges are
responsible, too: in a public "Letter to the
Nation's Trial Judges", Mr Schwartz
beseeched judges to drop their "pass them
through" mentality.
A share of the blame likewise lies with
Congress, which can bring the curtain
down on mass asbestos actions but has
declined to do so. This is notwithstanding
earnest bleating and begging by the
Supreme Court.
The third problem, though, is cultural:
that attitude that sees big awards as
compensation for all life's other wrongs. It
is not the juries alone that I blame here
but also the press and politicians who
support the attitude that personal injury
trials are a lottery. In a recent article,
author Nicholas Lemann wrote that the
personal injury suit may well have
become, for America, "the metaphor that
does the political work for liberalism".
A Common Law system, after all, is not
theatre but a national privilege; it allows
courts and citizens the right to make law,
instead of faraway authorities. To retain
that privilege, though, we have to recall
that good common law is based on good
common sense.
Copyright © 2002 FinancialTimes.com
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Asbestos Is Gold For Trial Lawyers
Eagle Forum
May 8, 2002
Phyllis Schlafly
Asbestos litigation has spun so far out of
control that the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear an appeal directly from an
intermediate state court. Multi-million
dollar verdicts are being awarded to
healthy plaintiffs based on speculation
about possible future harm from past
exposure to asbestos.
A West Virginia state court awarded
millions of dollars to a few workers
without evidence of physical or
independently corroborated emotional
harm from exposure to asbestos, and
without apportioning damages based on
relative culpability. The case, based on the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (which
pertains to railroad workers), is Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, Freeman et
al.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly
implored Congress to save the courts
from having to handle asbestos lawsuits.
But the usual victims of this litigation are
engineering companies that lack political
muscle and are no match for the political
clout of the trial lawyers.
America's top asbestos producer, Johns
Manville, was forced into bankruptcy in
1982. By 1992, Lloyds of London was
averaging nearing $3 billion a year in
losses, due mostly to asbestos claims.
Asbestos litigation has pushed at least 54
companies into bankruptcy, and
judgments are often imposed with little
regard for proof of wrongdoing or
causation. Encouraged by porous legal
standards, asbestos attorneys have filed
claims for more than 1.4 million persons,
against more than 1,400 companies.
In 2000, the four major companies sent
into bankruptcy by asbestos were
Armstrong World Industries (construction
products), Babcock & Wilcox (boilers),
Bums and Roe (engineering and
construction), and Pittsburgh Corning
(glass insulation). In 2001, asbestos
litigation casualties included the chemical
and materials giant W.R. Grace, the
prominent construction materials
company G.A.F., the gypsum wallboard
maker USG, and the auto-parts maker
Federal-Mogul.
Just in the past six months, Fortune 500
victims of the asbestos litigation monster
have seen sudden drops in their stock
prices. Hit with a Texas-sized verdict last
December, Halliburton stock abruptly
dropped 43 percent.
In February, a Manhattan jury awarded
$53 million to the estate of a deceased
auto mechanic who allegedly died from
exposure to asbestos in brake linings. That
decision jeopardizes the entire auto
industry, full-page ads for auto mechanics
with lung cancer now run in New York
newspapers.
In March, a West Virginia jury ordered
DuPont to pay $6.4 million to a bank
officer who died of mesothelioma. The
banker was allegedly injured by fibers that
might have attached to the clothing of his
father who worked with asbestos at
DuPont.
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Some of the cases involve heavy, lifelong
smokers who claim they have asbestosis,
an asbestos-related disease. Plaintiffs and
defendants bring in medical experts who
testify to contrary diagnoses, and the jury
is left to decide, often against the
corporate defendants.
In February, 2,645 plaintiffs sued asbestos
attorneys, claiming that "this case arises
from corruption within the asbestos
personal injury bar." Reports are that the
majority of asbestos settlements enrich the
attorneys, rather than going to the
allegedly harmed individuals.
The demonizing of asbestos is an odd fate
for a substance that exists widely in
nature, including the rocks supporting
highly populated cities such as San
Francisco. No material can approach its
versatility and effectiveness and, for
decades, asbestos saved countless lives
because of its remarkable strength,
durability, and resistance to fire.
In 1998, the prestigious New England
Journal of Medicine reported no increased
risk of death from cancer because of
prolonged exposure to asbestos. Based on
a thorough study of mines and mills that
have the world's greatest concentration of
asbestos, the researchers concluded: "The
[Environmental Protection Agency]
model overestimated the risk of asbestos-
induced lung cancer by at least a factor of
10."
Until now, the U.S. Supreme Court has
been unwilling to curtail the legal circus
and its calamitous consequences. The
Court has manifested unusual restraint as
verdicts were rendered, sometimes
without any proof of wrongdoing or
causation by the defendants who have
been forced to pay astronomical damages.
As more claims were decided for workers
involved in the manufacture of asbestos,
the trial attorneys began casting their nets
wider. Any firm that had any contact with
asbestos is at risk for unjustified litigation,
so asbestos is hastily excluded and
removed at great expense.
Meanwhile, observers have noted that the
replacement of asbestos with less effective
material may have played a role in (1) the
explosion of the Challenger [space
shuttle], (2) the great New Orleans Rail
Yard Fire of 1987, and (3) the premature
collapse of the World Trade Towers on
9/11/2001. The government is now
contradicting itself by claiming that, while
asbestos lining within the towers would
have been unsafe, asbestos emitted by the
collapse of the towers is safe.
The unusual consideration by the
Supreme Court of the Norfolk & Western
Railway case may signal that the Court is
no longer waiting for congressional action.
But will Court action be too little and too
late?
[Phyllis Schlafly is a lawyer, author, and
the founder of the Eagle Forum, a
national volunteer organization engaged in
the pro-family movement]
Copyright @ 2002 Phyllis Schlafly
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01-1325 Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington
Ruling Below: (Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 9" Cir., 271 F.3d 835, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 24405, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9663, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 12063)
The court found that government use of interest from trust funds comprised of the pooled
funds of lawyers' clients (that would not normally be earning interest) was not a violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court found the impact on the clients was
trivial to non-existent, and thus was neither a taking nor justly compensable.
Question Presented: Whether the regulatory scheme for funding state legal services by
systematically seizing property held in so-called IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer's Trust)
accounts violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment so that the property owners
are entitled to relief.
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON; et al, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided November 14, 2001
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
Four individuals, Allen Brown, Greg
Hayes, Dennis Daugs, and Dian Maxwell,
and the Washington Legal Foundation
(collectively "Appellants") challenge the
legality of Washington State's Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Account ("IOLTA")
program on First and Fifth Amendment
grounds. Beginning where the Supreme
Court left off in Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 160, 141
L. Ed. 2d 174, 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998),
Appellants contend that the Washington
State IOLTA program unconstitutionally
takes the interest generated by their
monies placed in IOLTA trust accounts
and compels speech. We review this case
en banc to consider whether there has
been an unconstitutional taking, i.e., a
taking without just compensation, of
property belonging to Appellants. In
doing so, we reject the analytical approach
that "trifurcates" the Fifth Amendment
issues, previously taken of procedural
necessity or otherwise by other courts.
Believing the better approach to be
consideration of the Fifth Amendment
question as a whole, we must decide
whether the State of Washington, by
establishing its IOLTA program and
applying it to Limited Practice Officers,
took property belonging to any of the five
Appellants without providing just
compensation therefor. We analyze this
issue in accordance with the dictates of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), and
hold that with respect to the funds
deposited into client trust accounts by the
Limited Practice Officers in this case,
there has been no taking of property
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without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. [...]
I. IOLTA
[The court recited the historical
background of the legal and banking
professions leading up to the creation of
the IOLTA programs.
IOLTA programs pool client trust
deposits into one large fund that is able to
accrue interest for the purpose of
providing legal services for the indigent.
The Washington Supreme Court created
an IOLTA program and the Legal
Foundation of Washington, which would
administer the funding generated the
IOLTA
In 1995, the IOLTA program was
extended to state-licensed non-lawyers
who were authorized to complete real
estate transactions. Real estate companies
were then required to place their clients'
funds in an IOLTA account unless
specific accommodations were made for
the funds to be placed in a different
interest-bearing account. This was not
standard practice for real estate companies
because of the difficulties inherent in
using such accounts. Rather, the funds
would be placed in non-interest bearing
accounts, and banks would provide the
companies with credits towards banking
fees.]
II. Procedural History
[The Washington Legal Foundation filed
suits in a number of states challenging the
constitutionality of the programs. Phillps
v Washington Lqgl Fwration, 524 U.S.
156, 141 L. Ed. 2d 174, 118 S. Ct. 1925
(1998), was the first of these cases to be
ruled on by the Supreme Court. The
Court ruled only on the narrow issue of
whether the interest income was pnvate
property, which the Court found it was.
This court ruled on several jurisdictional
issues. It found that only Brown and
Hayes had property interests at stake.
Daug and Maxwell lacked individual
standing, and the Washington Legal
Foundation lacked representational
standing. The court found that the issue
was ripe.]
B. Unconstitutional Taking
The Phils majority did not address the
question of whether an unconstitutional
taking of private property occurred[.]
** *
In determining the existence of the
property right, the Phillps majority stated
that the accrued interest "attaches as a
property right incident to the ownership
of the underlying principal." Phill s, 524
U.S. at 168. Thus, the Court
acknowledged that without the principal,
there would be no interest and no
property right in that interest. Because the
latter does not exist without the former,
we believe that it is logically sound to
analyze the two in combination for
purposes of determining whether a taking
of property occurred. [... ]
a. Per se v. Ad Hoc Analysis
[The court found the per se takings
analysis to be inappropriate when dealing
with money. In cases similar to this one,
the court has generally used the ad hoc
takings analysis employed in Penn Central
Trarsportatzon Ca v City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct.
2646 (1978). The court supported its use
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of ad hoc analysis by citing the Philh's
decision, the public nature of the
program, and the heavily-regulated nature
of the banking industry.]
b. Application of Ad Hoc Analysis
[The court defined a taking as occurring
when a regulation forces some people to
carry a burden for the public good that
should fairly be carried by the public as a
whole. The court cited three factors to
consider as set forth by the Penn Central
holding for determining when this is the
case: (1) economic impact on the
burdened party, (2) interference with
investment- backed expectations, and (3)
the character of the government action.]
(i) Economic Impact
[Most real estate companies did not
previously use interest-bearing accounts.
Because the IOLTA program requires
interest-bearing accounts, the economic
interests of the clients, as owners of the
principal, has been improved, not harmed.
The price of some real estate transactions
has increased because of fees assessed to
cover banking charges, but the court
found that this was irrelevant to the
economic impact analysis because neither
Brown nor Hayes showed they had been
charged such fees. Additionally, the
increased banking fees were the result of
private pricing decisions, not mandated by
the government]
(ii) Interference with Distinct Investment-
Backed Expectations
[Without the government regulation,
neither Brown nor Hayes could expect
that their money would earn interest, thus
the IOLTA program did not interfere.]
(iii) Character of Government Action
Brown and Hayes concede that they
would have no interest without IOLTA,
but they argue that, once interest is
created, they have the right to determine
what -- if anything -- is done with the
interest. Viewing the accrued interest as its
own entity, divorced from the principal,
for the purpose of characterizing the
extent of the "property" taken, Brown and
Hayes assert that because the IOLTA
rules dictate that all the interest earned on
IOLTA accounts must go to the Legal
Foundation of Washington, the IOLTA
program is the equivalent of a 100 percent
physical invasion of their property. We
disagree.
The IOLTA rules are better viewed as a
regulation of the uses of Brown's and
Hayes's property, consisting of the
principal and the accrued interest in
aggregation. That said, the character of
the government action is best viewed in
the context of the industry it regulates.
[The court explained that banking and the
legal profession have both been heavily
regulated. The court asserts that the
IOLTA program seems appropriate given
that context.]
The Takings Clause does not prevent the
Government from being able to regulate
how people use their property but limits
that ability to what is "just and fair. "
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-67 Although "the
government may impose regulations to
adjust rights and econonuic interests
among people for the public good," it may
''not force 'some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar
Found., 993 F.2d at 974 (citation omitted).
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Here, neither Brown nor Hayes is being
singled out to bear a burden that should
be borne by the public as a whole. They,
as participants in our legal system, are
required to place their money in IOLTA
trust accounts that generate funds at no
cost to them and that expand access to the
legal system from which they benefit.
Given the highly regulated nature of the
banking and professional industries the
IOLTA rules affect, this additional
unobtrusive regulation does not exceed
what is "just and fair" -- especially where
Brown and Hayes would have earned no
interest absent IOLTA. We therefore
conclude that Washington State's IOLTA
program does not take either Brown's or
Hayes's property.
2. Just Compensation
There is a second reason why Washington
State's IOLTA program does not work a
constitutional violation with regard to
Brown's and Hayes's property. Even if
their property was taken, the Fifth
Amendment only protects against a taking
without just compensation. Because of the
way the IOLTA program operates, the
compensation due Brown and Hayes for
any taking of their property would be nil.
There was therefore no constitutional
violation when they were not
compensated.
[The court found that just compensation
is putting the owner in as good a position
as if the property had not been taken.
The only right taken from Brown and
Hayes was the right to not earn interest,
which is a loss of no economic value. The
court argued that Brown and Hayes were
not seeking compensation for the lost
interest, but for the value added to their
property by the IOLTA program. Value
added to property by state intervention
has never been compensated under the
Takings Clause.]
VI. First Amendment
The district court did not address
Appellants' First Amendment claims
because it concluded that Appellants did
not have a property right to the interest at
issue. Because this conclusion was
abrogated by Philhos, the district court
must now consider what speech, if any, is
at issue and whether the IOLTA program
violates any rights Appellants may have
emanating from the First Amendment.
[... ]
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district
court's grant of summary judgment with
respect to Appellants' Fifth Amendment
claims is affirmed, and its grant of
summary judgment with respect to
Appellants' First Amendment claims is
vacated and remanded. Each party shall
bear its own costs of appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part,
and REMANDED.
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, with whom
judges Trott, Kleinfeld and Silverman
join, dissenting:
*~ * *
The majority starts down the wrong track
by asserting, as if it were an established
fact, that there are some kinds of private
property the government may take
without paying compensation: "An
allegation that private property for which
no compensation is due has been taken is
insufficient to sustain a Fifth Amendment
claim because it is the taking without just
compensation that is constitutionally
prohibited." Maj. Op. at 15663 (emphasis
added). But, before today, no case has
ever held that there are some kinds of
"private property for which no
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compensation is due." The cases the
majority cites stand for a much different
proposition: They hold that the Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit the taking
of property, as it clearly does not; what it
prohibits is the taking of property without
compensation. This does not support the
majority's claim that there are certain
kinds of property the government may
take without paying compensation.
[... ] [The majority in Phlps made it quite
clear that economic value is not the only
interest protected by the just
compensation clause: "While the interest
income at issue here may have no
economically realizable value to its owner,
possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in
the property." Philips, 524 U.S. at 170.
Philis speaks directly to our case when it
states: "The government may not seize
rents received by the owner of a building
simply because it can prove that the costs
incurred in collecting the rents exceed the
amount collected." Id.
[... ] [C]ontrary to the majority's assertion,
it is not true that a court is free to choose
whether it prefers the ad hoc approach or
the per se approach in taking cases.
Rather, the two approaches reflect
different solutions to different problems.
The majority's blurring of the distinction
between regulatory takings and physical
takings is alarming. In a complex world, a
property owner will always get some
benefit, real or theoretical, from a taking
of his property.
My colleagues try to avoid the clear
teaching of Philps by arguing that the per
se approach of Lomtto and similar cases
applies primarily to takings of real
property. Maj. Op. at 15667-68. Of
course, this is not true; if the city wants to
display your Renoir in its museum, it can't
just take it and compensate you with the
joy of viewing it during visiting hours. [...]
For purposes of the takings clause, then,
real and personal property are reduced to
their cash equivalents. It thus strikes me as
peculiar and quite dangerous to say that
the government has greater latitude when
it takes money than when it takes other
kinds of property. This portion of the
majority's opinion will doubtless be
greeted with a rousing cheer by
government officials who will eagerly look
to bank accounts and other places where
money is kept, with an eye to snatching a
few dollars here and there, and justifying it
with some sort of "ad hoc" analysis.
[... ] Nowhere--and certainly not in Speny-
-does the Supreme Court suggest that the
government's obligation to pay
compensation is eliminated because it
takes money rather than real or personal
property. Indeed, Phillis makes it very
clear that Sperry does not apply to this
situation, because this is not a case where
the government is charging for a service it
renders. See Phillps, 524 U.S. at 171. My
colleagues again disregard the teachings of
the Phillips majority.
[The dissent adopted the decision of the
three-judge panel and reproduced it as
part of its opinion].
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge.
Defendants seem to be arguing
government can confiscate
money without it being a
that the
people's
taking
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compensable under the Fifth
Amendment, based on cases where the
government provided a service and
charged a reasonable user fee for the
service. Taken out of the context of users'
fees, the proposition is absurd. Unlike
medieval England, most assets are now
held in the form of fungible intangibles
such as bank accounts, money market
accounts, and securities. The Fifth
Amendment protection of property would
be eviscerated were we to construe
confiscation of fungible intangibles as not
amounting to a taking, as defendants urge.
The Supreme Court drew precisely this
distinction, between reasonable users' fees
and the interest on IOLTA accounts, in
Phillips, noting that it "would be a
different case" if the state were "imposing
reasonable fees it incurs in generating and
allocating interest income." Phillps holds
that Unital States v Speny Corp., the user
fee case, has no application to complete
"confiscation of respondents' interest
income" by an IOLTA program where the
funds are managed by banks and private
individuals.
Defendants make another, more
appealing, argument from Perm Gnral that
the "economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment- backed expectations
are, of course, relevant considerations."
The argument is that, because the
plaintiffs could not have realized any
money from the IOLTA funds, the
economic impact is nonexistent, and
because the IOLTA rule was in effect
when they acted, the IOLTA rule could
not have interfered with their
expectations.
This argument fails on several
independent grounds. First, the
"economic impact" test is articulated in
Penn Cenral in the context of regulation of
the use of real estate, not deprivation in its
entirety of any property. The point of the
economic impact test in Pem Cenral is to
distinguish government regulations of the
owner's use of property permissible under
its police power from those that go too
far, requiring the government to
compensate the owner for taking his
property. That distinction is not necessary
or appropriate where the government
entirely appropriates a sum of money
belonging to a private individual. [... ]
[... ] When the government permanently
appropriates all of the interest on IOLTA
trust funds, that is a per se taking, as when
it permanently appropriates by physical
invasion of real property.
Second, it is not quite correct to say that
IOLTA as structured does not deprive
clients of any money. The rule says that in
determining whether to deposit money
held in trust into the IOLTA account or
an account where the client will receive
the interest, a lawyer must consider "only
whether the funds to be invested could be
utilized to provide a positive net return to
the client," based on the interest to be
earned while the funds "are expected to
be" deposited, and the various expenses
including lawyers' fees for administering
interest payable to the client. This leaves
two ways in which, as a practical matter,
the client may lose an economically
significant amount of interest. One,
probably quite common, is where the
funds "are expected to be" deposited for a
much shorter period than they actually
are. [... ]
The second way a client may lose interest
is that the costs of lawyers' and closing
officers' services are overestimated. As a
practical matter, the lawyers and closing
officers have a substantial incentive not to
be bothered with crediting clients with
their interest. It is therefore in their
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deposits
tune to get
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Critics of Mandatory IOLTA Have Their Day
The National LawJoumal
June 17, 2002
The high court's decision to resolve
whether the Washington program
constitutes a "takings" of clients' property
without just compensation, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, came on the heels
of a 7-7 decision by the 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals not to hear en banc a
panel ruling that the Texas IOLTA
program does violate the Fifth
Amendment. The Washington Legal
Foundation had also challenged the Texas
program.
The 5th Circuit panel mling conflicted
with the 9th Circuit's decision upholding
the constitutionality of the Washington
IOLTA program last January and the stars
were aligned for cert review by the
Supreme Court.
The basic IOLTA programs in both states
are "exactly the same," said Richard Samp
of the Washington Legal Foundation.
"Some state programs are voluntary in the
sense that lawyers can choose to
participate." The Texas and Washington
programs are mandatory, he explained,
adding, "The Washington program is
somewhat broader because it applies not
only to funds held by lawyers but also to
funds held by real estate professionals. It
operates in the same way as to both those
groups.
IOLTA programs exist in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia. According to
the American Bar Association, IOLTA
programs represent the second-largest
funding source of civil legal services in
this country. Under federal banking rules,
not all client deposits are eligible to be put
into an IOLTA account. Any client funds
that can earn more interest in a non-
IOLTA account than would be consumed
by bank administrative costs may not be
placed in IOLTA accounts.
In the Washington case, a 9th Circuit
panel said the challengers were actually
seeking compensation for the value added
to their property by Washington's IOLTA
program.
"In other words, Brown and Hayes
(plaintiffs) are seeking compensation not
for the value of what they lost, but for the
value of what the Legal Foundation of
Washington has created," said the panel.
"In the context of real property, it is clear
that the owner of condemned land need
not be compensated for the value created
by the government's exercise of the power
of eminent domain."
Although the high court will hear the
Washington challenge next term, a cert
petition will be filed in the Texas case
shortly{... ]
The Supreme Court has faced the Texas
challenge once already, ruling in 1998 that
the interest earned on client funds is the
property of the client for the purpose of a
takings analysis. Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, 521 U.S. 1117. But the
justices left the takings question for
another day that is now approaching.
Copyright © 2002 American Lawyer
Media
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A Matter of Principle
The Recorder
January 24, 2001
George M. Kraw
No matter how well intentioned IOLTA
programs may be, they are wrong unless
they are voluntary.
The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
ruled this month that the interest belongs
to the client. The decision found that the
Washington state "Interest on Lawyers
Trust Accounts" program constituted a
"taking " entitling clients to "just
compensation under the Fifth
Amendment." It sent Washington Legal
Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 01 C.D.O.S. 297, back to a
lower court to determine what that
compensation should be. Proponents are
hoping to salvage Ninth Circuit IOLTA
programs by arguing that the loss of
interest is so small that in most cases "just
compensation" is little or nothing.
But mandatory IOLTA programs also
violate client First Amendment rights.
Individual legal consumers are compelled
to contribute to legal aid programs
arguing public positions that some
oppose.
The Ninth Circuit didn't reach this issue.
The First Amendment claim will be the
basis for further challenges to mandatory
programs to the extent they survive this
latest setback
It wouldn't be difficult for IOLTA
managers and state bars to avoid
constitutional challenges. They could ask,
"May we?" before taking a client's trust
fund interest on a small or short-term
deposit for legal aid programs.
Even though some states have made
IOLTA voluntary for lawyers, most of the
legal system is not used to treating client
choice with similar deference. So instead
we have continuing litigation over IOLTA
programs that already has produced one
Supreme Court decision, Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S.
156. This 1998 case held that clients had a
"property interest" in trust account
interest earned by the Texas IOLTA
program. The decision guided the Ninth
Circuit analysis.
Phillips is back in the Fifth Circuit on
remand and is set for oral arguments in
February, with opponents expecting to
land a knock out punch on the Texas
program.
That result is anticipated in a recent Texas
appellate court decision which states that
a client can order a lawyer to withdraw the
client's funds from an IOLTA account.
Before IOLTA existed, banks kept the
money earned on client trust accounts.
Ethics rules prevented lawyers from
receiving any interest on the accounts. Bar
associations created IOLTA to capture
the "lost" interest and divert it to legal aid.
This compulsory diversion was a
controversial policy choice. The result has
been opposition to IOLTA since day one
from those who for various reasons --
political, social, economic, even religious
oppose the activities of agencies that
receive IOLTA funding. Critics like
Suffolk University law professor Charles
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E. Rounds Jr. argue that "a substantial
portion" of IOLTA funds nationwide
actually goes to "political activity ...
lobbying and general legislative advocacy,"
instead of helping "the legal needs of the
poor.
Leading the charge against IOLTA plans
is the Washington Legal Foundation, a
D.C-based group headed by former
attorney general Dick Thornburgh. It was
the lead plaintiff in Phillips and the Ninth
Circuit case. The Foundation's advisory
committees have contributed four
nominees for the new Bush cabinet.
IOLTA proponents may not like the
individual rights arguments made by the
Foundation, but they will have to learn to
accommodate them.
The other, individual challengers to the
Washington state IOLTA program (which
also covered certain real estate escrows)
complained both about loss of interest
and the activities supported by the
IOLTA fund. They may have been made
unenthusiastic by some of the reported
cases of state IOLTA beneficiaries.
Professor Rounds cites a Washington
IOLTA grantee that prevented a public
housing authority from evicting a resident
who tried to run over his neighbor with a
car.
Voluntary programs with disclosure
requirements will create additional
bureaucratic requirements for lawyers,
who will end up being responsible for
explaining alternatives to clients. More
conscientious attorneys will want to spell
out in detail the competing concerns
raised by IOLTA.
Even legal consumers who oppose legal
aid activities still may want to participate
in voluntary programs. An IOLTA pooled
account is cheaper in most instances than
setting up a separate individual client
account. Often its administrative costs will
be less expensive than calculating and
paying out the interest in a non-IOLTA
pooled account to individual clients. Small
practitioners -- who before IOLTA had to
pay bank charges for trust accounts
because their general accounts were too
small to qualify them for a fee waiver --
would continue to receive a free IOLTA
account.
Ultimately, IOLTA won't solve the
representation problems that legal aid
programs attempt to address. That
requires top to bottom reform, and
measures that drive down the costs of
legal services for all consumers and also
simplify dispute resolution.
But meanwhile, clients should not be
forced to participate in IOLTA programs
against their will. If supporters keep
insisting on mandatory programs, the
programs are going to continue to be
challenged in the courts and other
branches of government. And they are
going to continue to lose.
George M. Kraw is a San Jose attorney.
Copyright © 2001 American Lawyer
Media, L.P.
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IOLTA and the Takings Clause Scrooges
ConnecticutLaw Tribune
March 25, 2002
[ ... ] [T]he Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts (IOLTA) program is the most
significant mechanism to help fund legal
services for the poor.
Unable to persuade the establishment bar,
court rule makers or state legislatures to
eliminate o[r] restrict IOLTA, IOLTA's
opponents have adopted a strategy they
ordinarily deride: asking federal courts to
invalidate as a violation of individual
rights a state program whose policy goals
they find objectionable. Their theory?
IOLTA constitutes a "taking" of "private
property" without "just compensation" in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.
They claim that a state court cannot direct
the interest income generated from a law
firm's clients' funds account without also
paying, in return, "just compensation." If
accepted, this claim could doom most
IOLTA programs for one obvious reason:
the theoretical "compensation" owed by
the IOLTA trustee would equal the very
amount the trustee had received, leaving
no net revenue available for legal services
organizations. So why shouldn't every law
firm establish a separate account for every
client deposit to ensure the client is paid
the de minimis interest earnings
attributable to the principal amount of his
short-term deposit? As every law firm
administrator knows, the answer is: there
are no such earnings. Or put another way,
because the bank's service fees would
equal or exceed whatever interest earnings
might be generated from the temporary
deposit, the net gain for the client is zero,
or in some cases, less than zero.
Thus, IOLTA's opponents are
championing the abstract and Scrooge-like
proposition that citizen Ebenezer should
have the unfettered right to keep his
money from earning interest and to
exclude fellow citizen Cratchit from ever
benefiting from the money regardless of
any actual-or even potential-loss in its
value or interference with its use.
Unfortunately, they have found some
judicial sympathy.
In June, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, by
a 5-4 vote, held, in Philips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, that the interest income
generated by funds in accounts subject to
the Texas courts' IOLTA program does
constitute "private property" of the client
within the meaning of the Takings Clause.
However, the Court did not reach the
ultimate questions of whether under
IOLTA- (a) the client's "property" had
been "taken"; and (b) if so, the amount,
"if any," of "just compensation" due the
client. The court majority therefore
remanded the case for the lower courts'
determination of those two issues.
Last October, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, issued its decision on remand in
the Philips case. By a 2 to 1 vote, the
panel invalidated Texas' IOLTA program
on the basis of the Takings Clause.
Notwithstanding the trial court's specific
finding that the plaintiff-client had not
established any quantifiable loss due to his
lawyer's participation in IOLTA, and
without any direction for an award of
damages, the court concluded that, under
the Fifth Amendment, the Texas IOLTA
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rules cannot be enforced without paying
"just compensation" to every participating
client. Four weeks later, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, came to the opposite
conclusion. By a 7 to 4 vote, an en banc
panel of the Court held that even if a
deposit of client funds under the
challenged IOLTA program did amount
to a "taking", the theoretical "just
compensation" owed the client amounted
to a grand total of "nil." Therefore no
constitutional violation could have
occurred when Washington state's IOLTA
administrator failed to pay
"compensation" for a loss valued at zero.
These two rulings obviously set the stage
for the Supreme Court to finally resolve
the question. It is not an overstatement to
say the state of legal services for the poor
is in the balance. Although the test case
plaintiffs can't establish that IOLTA has
caused any loss to clients, a holding
invalidating IOLTA will, without
question, cause significant losses to legal
services. In Connecticut, the Connecticut
Legal Services Corp. currently depends on
IOLTA for about 65 percent of its annual
budget.
The present Supreme Court majority
normally demands deference to a state's
right to regulate its own poverty
programs, at least when policymakers cut
such funding. So too they ordinarily are
sticklers for weeding out from the federal
courts' dockets those civil rights claimants
unable to meet their burden of proving an
actual, rather than a theoretical, injury.
With the life or death of IOLTA on the
line, supporters of legal services for the
poor can only hope for some judicial
consistency.
Copyright © 2002 NLP IP Company
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01-1289 State Farm Mutual Auto. v. Campbell
Ruling Below: (Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto., UT Sup.Ct., 2001 UT 89, 432 Utah
Adv. Rep. 44, 2001 Utah Lexis 170)
The court upheld a jury verdict of $145 million in punitive damages against the
defendant. The court found the award was proper under federal and state law.
Question Presented: Whether a $ 145 million punitive damage award that punishes out-of-
state conduct, is 145 times greater than the compensatory damages in the case, and is based
on the defendant's alleged business practices nationwide over a 20-year period, which were
unrelated and dissimilar to conduct by the defendant thatgave rise to the plaintiffs' claims, is
in violation of the due process clause?
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Top Court To Review Punitive Damages
National Underwriter - Pmoperty & Casualty
July 1, 2002
Steven Brostoff
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to
review the constitutionality of a $ 145
million punitive damage award assessed
against State Farm.
In State Farm v Cznpdl, the
Bloomington, Ill.-based insurer is seeking
to overturn a Utah Supreme Court
decision imposing the award for allegedly
handling a claim in bad faith and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of punitive damages several
times. In a series of cases, the high court
said that there are constitutional limits to
punitive damages, but it has never
presented a formula for determining those
limits. In State Farm v Canpidl, a State
Farm policyholder, Curtis B. Campbell,
was involved in an auto accident that
killed one person and disabled another.
According to the opinion filed by the
Utah Supreme Court, State Farm collected
evidence that Mr. Campbell was at fault
for the accident. Nonetheless, State Farm
declined to settle. The court said State
Farm's attorney assured Mr. Campbell
that he would represent his interests, that
his assets were safe, and that he need not
hire his own attorney.
The case against Mr. Campbell went to
trial, and the jury found him 100 percent
liable. The jury awarded the other parties
damages that exceeded Mr. Campbell's
policy limits. The Utah court said that
State Farm's attorney told Mr. Campbell
and his wife that they should put "for
sale" signs on their property.
Subsequently, Mr. Campbell entered into
an agreement with the other parties to the
accident under which Mr. Campbell
would pursue a bad faith action against
State Farm, subject to certain conditions,
and the other parties would agree not to
demand that Mr. Campbell pay his
obligations.
Several years later, after the liability
judgment against Mr. Campbell was
affirmed on appeal, State Farm paid all the
damages arising from the accident -- both
its policy limits and the excess.
Mr. Campbell then filed the action against
State Farm that led to the punitive damage
award, charging that its actions were in
bad faith and caused him emotional
distress. State Farm argued that its
decision not to settle the accident was an
"honest mistake" that did not justify
punitive damages.
Mr. Campbell, however, charged that
State Farm's decision was part of a
"national scheme" designed to meet
corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts.
The jury ultimately awarded Mr. Campbell
$ 2.6 million in compensatory damages
and $ 145 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge later reduced the punitive
award to $ 25 million.
Both State Farm and Mr. Campbell
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
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State Farm argued that the $ 25 million
punitive damage award was excessive. Mr.
Campbell, on the other hand, argued that
the trial judge erred in reducing the award,
and asked the Utah Supreme Court to
reinstate the $ 145 million judgment. The
Utah Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr.
Campbell, and reinstated the higher
award.
During the Utah Supreme Court
proceeding, State Farm argued that the
punitive damage judgment was excessive
on several fronts. State Farm said:
* First, that the award is more than triple
the actual damages -- a ratio that is seldom
upheld by Utah courts.
* Second, that the size of the award
violates the constraints articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court, which has suggested
a three-part analytical test to determine
constitutionality.
(The three-part test is the degree of
reprehensibility of the conduct, the
disparity between the harm suffered and
the punitive damage award, and the
difference between the award and the civil
or criminal penalties imposed in
comparable cases.)
* Third, that the Utah court erred by
allowing Mr. Campbell to present
evidence of a "national scheme." State
Farm said allowing this evidence violated
the Utah Rules of Evidence because it had
nothing to do with the company's conduct
towards Mr. Campbell.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected all of
State Farm's arguments.
Looking specifically at the U.S. Supreme
Court's test for analyzing punitive damage
awards, the Utah court said that the $ 145
million award satisfies it.
First, the court said, a high award is
justified under the standard assessing the
disparity between the harm suffered and
the award because State Farm's
"fraudulent conduct has been a consistent
way of doing business for the last 20
years.
The likelihood of further misconduct is
high, the court said, and the effect on Mr.
and Mrs. Campbell was severe, since they
had to live in constant fear of financial
run.
As for the comparison between the award
and civil or criminal penalties authorized
in comparable cases, the Utah court said
that imprisonment is possible for the
alleged conduct. That, the court said, is a
strong indication that the conduct
warrants high punitive damages.
Copyright @ 2002 The National
Underwriter Company
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State Farm Ordered to Pay $146 Mln Award by Utah High Court
Bloomberg News
October 20, 2001
William McQuillen
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. "deceived and cheated" customers,
"harassed and intimidated" claimants,
witnesses and lawyers, and concealed
evidence, the Utah Supreme Court ruled,
in restoring a $146 million jury award
against the largest U.S. auto and home
insurer.
"State Farm engaged in a pattern of
trickery and deceit, false statements and
other acts of affirmative misconduct
targeted at financially vulnerable persons,"
the state's highest court said in a 4-1
decision that reversed a trial judge's
reduction of the jury award to $26 million.
The company's harassment of witnesses
included investigating their personal lives,
in one case paying a hotel maid to find out
if an opposition witness had overnight
visitors in her room, the court decision
says. "Such conduct is malicious,
reprehensible and wrong," the court
wrote.
The case stems from State Farm's refusal
to pay $50,000 to settle claims against
policyholder Curtis Campbell, who was
found responsible for a 1981 accident that
killed one man and disabled another. The
$50,000 equaled Campbell's policy limit.
'Bad Faith'
State Farm refused to pay, letting the case
go to trial even though it knew of expert
and eyewitness testimony against
Campbell, court papers say. Campbell
faced $180,000 in damages -- or $130,000
more than his policy limit -- after the trial.
Campbell sued State Farm for refusing to
settle the claims, arguing it was part of a
"national scheme to meet corporate fiscal
goals by capping payouts on claims
company wide," court papers say. Jurors
awarded $2.6 million in compensation and
$145 million in punitive damages.
"The jury found that State Farm had acted
unreasonably and in bad faith in its
decision to take the case to trial," the
Supreme Court said.
A trial judge reduced that award in
December 1997 to $1 million in
compensatory damages and $25 million in
punitive damages. The high court
yesterday said the trial judge erred in
cutting the punitive damages based solely
on the ratio of punitive- to-compensatory
damages.
Paul Belnap, State Farm's Utah lawyer,
couldn't be reached for comment. He told
the Associated Press that the company
denies improper dealings and may appeal.
State Farm has changed its policies and
now guarantees policyholders that it will
pay any judgment over policy limits if it
takes a case to trial, Belnap told the AP.
Copyright a 2001 Bloomberg L.P.
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Jury Orders State Farm to Pay $145 Million Insurer Ordered to Pay $145 Million
The Salt Lake Tribune
August 1, 1996
Sheila RK McCann
A Salt Lake City jury imposed $ 145
million in punitive damages against State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
on Wednesday night, siding with a retired
Lewiston couple who accused the
company of fraud and widespread
cheating.
Jurors also awarded $ 2.6 million in
compensatory damages to Curtis and Inez
Preece Campbell. They were not in the
courtroom when the verdict was read.
The couple sued the nation's largest auto
insurer in 1989, charging State Farm with
failing to protect Campbell's interests after
he was sued for causing a fatal 1981 car
accident in Cache County. The jury's
award will be shared with the Ogden
parents of Todd Ospital, 19, who was
killed, and Robert Slusher, then 26, who
lost partial use of his left arm.
Throughout two months of testimony,
Campbell and his attorneys accused State
Farm of routinely betraying its
policyholders nationwide and depriving
claimants of fair payments.
State Farm vehemently denied the
allegations. In a statement to be released
today, the company says it will seek to
have the verdict set aside, through
pursuing a new trial or an appeal.
The Campbells' attorney, Roger
Christensen, said he was "really gratified"
by the award.
"It's exactly what we had hoped to
achieve," he said. "It makes the years the
Campbells have maintained the battle
worthwhile."
On May 22, 1981, Campbell passed a
camper in Sardine Canyon near Logan as
Ospital approached in the oncoming lane.
Campbell moved back into his own lane,
but Ospital lost control after the close
pass and hit Slusher's car. Ospital was
killed.
Slusher and Ospital's parents sued
Campbell, but offered to settle for his $
50,000 insurance policy limit. State Farm
refused to settle and took the case to trial
in Logan. Campbell denied he was at fault
but was assessed $ 253,000 in damages.
Campbell and his wife then sued State
Farm for putting their home and assets at
risk instead of settling the lawsuits. Last
November, a Salt Lake City jury found
State Farm had acted unreasonably.
The new jury heard the couple's claims of
fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress and requests for
damages.
State Farm is "terribly disappointed" by
the verdict, said vice president and
counsel Michael Bragg. He is based at the
company's headquarters in Bloomington,
Ill., but has been in Salt Lake City during
the trial.
"We certainly thought we had done
everything we could," Bragg said. "We
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defended them [at the Logan trial]; we
fully did everything we could to protect
their interests."
After an appeal failed, State Farm paid the
Logan jury's full judgment plus interest,
Bragg noted.
At trial, the Campbells contended they
had suffered emotional distress from State
Farm's decision to gamble with their
assets at trial, and the subsequent delay in
paying the judgment.
To show the company's alleged intent to
defraud the Campbells, their attorneys
presented wide-ranging testimony about
the company's claims-handling practices.
Former State Farm employees claimed
they misled claimants about benefits and
altered or hid damaging documents.
But State Farm called employees, state
regulators and a statistical expert, who
defended the company's work and said
there was no evidence of a pattern of
misconduct.
In closing arguments Wednesday,
Campbell attorney Rich Humpherys asked
jurors to punish State Farm and deter
future wrongdoing by assessing a punitive
damage award between $ 25 million and $
100 million.
"When you have $ 55 billion in assets,
what does it take to get [State Farm's]
attention?" he asked. "What will cause
even the president to listen?"
State Farm collects $ 4.3 million a day in
surplus funds, Humpherys said. An award
of $ 25 million, for example, would
represent one week's surplus, he said.
Defense attorneys called
"outrageous." Concern
Campbell case has already led to a new
regional policy, said attorney Paul Belnap.
Now, if a policyholder gets an offer to
settle a lawsuit within policy limits -- but
State Farm opts to go to trial -- the
company will guarantee its payment of any
amount over the policy limit, Belnap said.
"This is a well-run, properly motivated
and honest company," he said.
"What does it take to get State Farm to
change?" he asked. "It doesn't take an
award like the plaintiff is claiming in this
case.
Defense attorney Stuart Schultz had urged
jurors to award a nominal amount -- $
2,800 -- for State Farm's refusal to settle.
He asked the jury to reject the couple's
claims of fraud and emotional distress.
About a year after the Logan jurys
verdict, the Campbells had negotiated a
deal to preserve their assets and knew they
were not at risk, Schultz noted. The
Ospitals and Slusher had agreed not to
foreclose on the Campbell's home, and in
exchange, they will share in the jury's
award.
The testimony about unrelated company
claims practices "has nothing to do with
the Campbell case," Schultz objected.
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